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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the motives of the European Union (EU) as a 
multilateral donor and whether its aid allocations are in accordance with the stated goals and 
objectives. The research question is: Which motives determine the aid allocations of the 
European Commission, and are the allocations in accordance with its stated goals? 
 
The research question’s relevance lies in the fact that the EC is the world’s largest multilateral 
donor. Also, the international donor community is setting new and ambitious goals to work 
together for poverty eradication, such as with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Furthermore, the EU is different from other multilateral donors as it is based on a regional 
constituency. It thus becomes necessary to evaluate whether the goals of the donor or its own 
strategic interests determine the direction of aid flows.  
 
The theory states a three-fold of donor motives: recipient needs, strategic interests and 
recipient merits. Moreover, theoretical postulations indicate that multilateral donors are more 
likely to follow their goals than bilateral donors, as they are supposed to be independent of 
member states’ interests. Nevertheless, the theory also states that multilateral donors are likely 
to be influenced by major shareholders or the aggregate of member states’ interests.   
 
To answer the research question, the thesis conducts a qualitative case study of the European 
Union as a multilateral donor. The analysis is based on data on aid flows from the OECD, 
reports, treaties, agreements and existing literature. The thesis finds that the development 
policy of the EU has changed from focusing on strategically important former colonies to 
focusing on poverty eradication and embracing all of the world’s poorest countries. However, 
the actual disbursements from the EC have moved in the other direction; while the strategic 
areas were in focus, the poorest countries benefited the most, whereas when poverty 
eradication became the main goal, the strategic neighbours of the EU were the main recipients. 
The thesis shows that the EU has a long way to go before it fulfils its objectives. The EU 
seems to be more preoccupied with rhetoric than action in the field of development policy, at 
least towards the poorest countries of the world.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Community, which in 1992 became the European Union (EU), contributed to 
approximately 12 percent of total aid from 1975 to 2003. This makes the organisation the 
world’s largest multilateral donor of aid to developing countries (Hansson 2007: 196) 1. As an 
aid donor, the EU likes to give an impression that it is a benevolent and altruistic actor in the 
global community. Slogans such as “Together for a better world” and statements like 
“Development policy is at the heart of the EU’s relations with all developing countries” are 
vigorously used, and the goals for poverty eradication set in the development policy are 
highly ambitious2. Yet, research on the European Commission’s (EC) aid allocations has 
shown that the EC tends to allocate aid based on its strategic interests. From this, I draw my 
research question: 
 
Which motives determine the aid allocations of the European Commission, and are the 
allocations in accordance with its stated goals? 
 
The focus on how the EC’s aid policy corresponds with the actual aid allocation is analysed in 
light of existing theories on aid allocation. The theoretical framework can be summarised 
through a distinction of donors and motives. Initially, it must be noted that it is difficult to 
capture donor motivation. However, this thesis will approach this issue through three 
theoretical categories of donor motives: strategic interests, recipient needs and recipient 
merits. Furthermore, the thesis will analyse whether it is the Member States, common EU 
interests or the goals and objectives in the development policy which influences the aid 
allocation. Thus, the aid allocation of the EC will be analysed by looking at its history, goals 
and the direction of aid in order to understand which motives has influenced the aid allocation. 
Another assumption is that there is a difference between the incentives for allocation of 
bilateral and multilateral donors. This theory claims that bilateral donors will allocate aid 
primarily based on strategic interests, while multilateral donors tend to follow their goals, and 
hence focus on the needs of the recipients and recipient merits. While allocating aid according 
                                                 
1
 The European Community was created in 1967 when EURATOM, the European Economic Community and 
the European Coal and Steal Community were fused. The European Union was established with the Maastricht 
Treaty, which was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1993.  
2
 “Together for a better world” is a slogan presented on many of the EU’s web-pages on development policies, 
and the statement “Development is at the heart of the EU’s relations with all developing countries” is written in 
the European Consensus on Development.  The ambitious goals of the EU will be elaborated on in chapter five. 
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to recipient needs is often associated with altruism, aid allocation based on donor interests is 
often implicitly or explicitly associated with the altruistic counterpart, self-interest. The EC 
stands out from the typical multilateral donors, as it is a donor with a regional constituency. It 
is therefore natural to assume that the EC will not act as a typical multilateral donor, being 
primarily altruistic, as it must take security issues, commerce and political ties into 
consideration. I will analyse the motives for donating aid from 1960 until 2008, to see 
whether the motives have changed with time. Also, I will evaluate whether the aid allocation 
corresponds with the goals and objectives set for the EU’s development policy. Though I 
conceptualise the EU as a multilateral donor, the EC is responsible for its aid allocation. 
Hence, it will refer to the EC when speaking of the multilateral allocations of the EU. When 
referring to the Union as a whole, and when speaking of its goals and objectives, the notion 
EU will be used as these are applicable to the entire Union. 
 
The thesis uncovers a quite striking paradox, finding that the allocations of the EC have 
become less poverty-oriented while the policies have changed from strategic areas to 
including all of the world’s developing countries and a focus on poverty eradication. This is 
displayed through the two-fold role of the EU as 1) a regional organisation with geo-political 
and commercial interests, and 2) a multilateral donor, with overarching goals to follow. This 
combination explains how the EC motives cannot be explained based solely on one category. 
This thesis will elaborate on how this can be explained through changing priorities in the EC, 
due to both internal and external historical trends. 
 
1.1 AID IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EU 
Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the EU has evolved and grown in scale and scope, as new 
Member States have joined and new policy areas have been added. The EU’s development 
policies have throughout the 20th century grown from being limited to its colonial ties, to 
focusing on all development countries. Furthermore, the role of the EU as a global actor is 
constantly growing in importance, as more Member States are joining and the budget for 
development assistance is increasing. It therefore becomes interesting to investigate what 
determines the aid allocation of the EC, whether the allocations are in accordance with the 
stated goals, and how historical events might have changed the direction of aid. As this thesis 
is an in-depth study of the EU as a multilateral donor, it is important to note that aid from the 
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EU comes both in the shape of bilateral aid directly from each Member State, but also as 
multilateral aid from the EC. The latter is the focus of this thesis.  
 
The common aid policy of the EU is directed by the Commission, which is the executive 
branch of the EU. However, decision-making on the common policy involves decision-
making both within the Member States and among the EU institutions (Olsen 2005: 578). The 
Commission is an independent body of the EU, which is nominated by its Member States, and 
charged with representing and upholding the interests of the EU as a whole (World Bank 
2009). It is also responsible for the EU budget. The EC is a large multilateral donor, as the EC 
provided eleven percent of global Official Development Aid (ODA) in 2004 (while the EU’s 
overall share was 55 percent) (World Bank 2009). The main tasks of the EC are to be the 
designer and manager of EU policies, with a monopoly right to propose legislation.  
 
1.2  THE IMPORTANCE OF AID RESEARCH 
Aid has become a vital measure in helping developing countries fight poverty; both in 
reducing short term problems such as natural disasters and famine, and in assisting them in 
establishing infrastructure and institutions such as hospitals and schools. As aid has become a 
central part of the relationship between wealthy countries and developing countries, the 
effects of aid and the determinants of aid allocation have also become important research 
areas.  
 
According to Alesina and Dollar (2000: 34), the foreign aid literature can be divided into two 
parts; One part considers the effect of foreign aid on the receiving country, while the other 
part looks at aid allocation, namely who gives aid to whom and why. In this thesis the focus 
will be on the latter. First of all, research on aid allocation is important because of the 
increasing focus on poverty eradication in the world community. Aid has traditionally been 
aimed at increasing economic growth, but in the recent years, the broad aim has changed more 
towards poverty alleviation. This can be seen in the Millennium Development Goals and the 
European Consensus on Development, which both aim to direct aid at reducing extreme 
poverty, through measures such as health care, education, reducing diseases and promoting 
gender equality (European Union 2006; World Bank 2004). How aid is allocated is therefore a 
very relevant topic, as aid is becoming a larger part of donor countries budgets, while poverty 
still prevails as an enormous problem in the world today. The creation of common 
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international objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals make this an even more 
current topic, as donors now work together to obtain their goals, and reduce poverty. This 
research is important, as it will reveal whether the aid policy actually determines the aid 
allocation, or if it seems to hold empty promises. With the world community setting new and 
ambitious goals for eradicating poverty, it becomes necessary to evaluate how the donors 
perform according to their own development policy.   
 
Secondly, research on aid allocation give a different angle to understanding why aid can be 
said to be effective or ineffective based on the interests of the donor. According to Masud and 
Yontcheva (2005: 4) one of the main reasons why studies on the effectiveness of aid have 
given disappointing results is that aid is misallocated. They argue that because many donors 
give aid for strategic reasons but to the wrong recipients, aid effectiveness studies have not 
shown promising results. This argument supports the view of Alesina and Dollar (2000: 33) 
who believe that a great deal of foreign aid is wasted, as it only leads to unproductive public 
consumption. They find evidence that foreign aid is distributed largely as a result of the 
political and strategic considerations of aid donors. Their main argument is that donors who 
give aid based on strategic and political interests will not consider the “correct” incentives in 
the receiving country, namely economic openness, good policies and income levels, but rather 
help politically friendly former colonies that might not have these “correct” incentives in 
place. Thus, allocating aid by considering strategic and political issues may cause aid to be 
ineffective in terms of economic growth or poverty alleviation.  
 
Aid allocation is highly influenced by the motives of the donors, and these motives differ 
between the various donors. Neumayer (2003: 7) argues that donors have the power to 
allocate aid so that it becomes more effective. One way donors can do this is through focusing 
more on allocating aid based on development criteria and less on self interests. The 
understanding of aid allocation motives is therefore very important in the effort towards 
reducing poverty. This argument shows that the study of aid allocation is highly important, 
both in order to learn how to increase the efficiency of aid and to assess donor behaviour. 
Research on aid allocation in itself is also important to assess what donors consider when they 
decide who to give aid to, or if they simply follow their stated goals. 
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1.3 SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE 
Research on aid, both in terms of aid effectiveness and aid allocation, represents a very 
comprehensive and quite complex literature. As noted above, these two different literatures 
compliment each other in the research on poverty reduction. The research on aid allocation 
searches to understand who gives aid to whom and why (Alesina and Dollar 2000: 34). Many 
scholars have analysed the motives of donors, using different statistical models and analysing 
different donors or groups of donors. Qualitative research which goes beyond simple 
description has been more limited. Also, the study of individual multilateral donors has not 
received as much attention as bilateral donors. As donor motives are complex and made up by 
a number of factors which are not all easily measured statistical analysis will conceal part of 
the picture. The existing literature has often analysed aggregates of bilateral or multilateral aid, 
therefore, studying them individually is important to reveal specific characteristics of the 
donors3. Most of the previous research also takes an exclusively quantitative approach to 
explaining the motives for aid allocation, and they do not explain the donor behaviour based 
on the historical and political background or the composition of the donor. Furthermore, 
despite the economic and political significance of EU development policy, it is an 
understudied area of EU politics (Arts and Dickson 2004: 3). By applying a qualitative 
comparative research design, this thesis seeks to analyse and explain how the EC as a 
multilateral donor with a regional constituency, balances its aid policy between the conflicting 
issues of political interests and striving towards behaving in a manner of solidarity. Hence, 
this thesis thus seeks to contribute to the existing literature by analysing the aid allocation of 
the EC, evaluating how well the goals set in the development policy are followed, and how 
historical events may have influenced the direction of aid.  
 
1.4 LIMITATIONS 
George and Bennett (2005: 74) argue that specification of the problem and research objective 
is an important first step in the research process. As the field of European development 
politics is very wide and comprehensive, it is necessary to clarify what this thesis does not 
focus on. First of all, this thesis solely considers the multilateral dimension of the EU, that is, 
aid administered by the EC, hence leaving out the bilateral aid flowing from its Member 
States. That is because the focus of the thesis is to understand how the EU acts as a 
multilateral donor, and why it can be said to be different from other multilaterals.  
                                                 
3
 For a list over previous research on aid allocation, see Neumayer 2003: 21-29. 
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Second, the EU has a presence on the global stage, which is manifested in four broad ways: 
trade policy, development policy, foreign policy and interregional dialogue (Rosamond 2000: 
175). However, the aspect of trade will not be analysed. Although trade is a large and 
important part of the EU’s external actions, and the areas of trade and aid sometimes tend to 
overlap, the topic of trade is somewhat at the sideline of what this thesis searches to analyse. 
Though both these aspects are important to the understanding of the EU as a global 
development actor, the inclusion of these aspects would render the thesis too comprehensive.  
 
Third, the thesis does not aim to explain how the EC works to fulfil its development policy. It 
rather seeks to evaluate whether the EC seems to be working towards its goals, based on its 
actual aid allocations. The EC has a multitude of aid instruments, and it would not be 
expedient to elaborate on all of these (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). 
Therefore, specific aid programmes of the EC will be discussed where necessary, but they 
will not be elaborated at length.  
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter two establishes the theoretical framework by discussing concepts, and presenting 
theories and previous research on donor motives. The theories are based on three categories of 
donor motives, namely donor interests, recipient needs and recipient merits, with a fourth 
category, possibilities for influence, which aims at explaining who decides the directions of 
allocations.  
 
In chapter three I present the method and data material used in this thesis, especially focusing 
on the case study and the choice of case. I also justify the choice of method and discuss the 
methodological trade offs. Furthermore, this chapter presents the data material used in this 
thesis, and operationalises the dimensions for analysis. 
 
Chapter four gives a description of the history of aid and the background of the European 
Economic Community and the European Union. It is necessary to get a thorough overview of 
how aid policy has evolved, as both international and internal historical events has influenced 
and sometimes changed the trail of thought of the donors, and thus the direction of aid. A 
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description of the history of development aid and the historical background of the EU in 
particular is therefore a necessary first step in understanding the EC’s donor behaviour.  
 
Chapter five gives an analytical description of how the European Commission, the institution 
of the European Union which is responsible for the allocation of aid, is composed, and 
whether the composition opens for Member State influence. This chapter also presents the 
development policy of the EU, as stated in its treaties, and internal and international 
agreements. It further discusses how the stated goals and objectives for development policy 
are obtainable and measurable.  
 
Chapter six presents the analysis in light of the dimensions presented in chapter three. 
Moreover, it discusses the findings, and how the aid allocation of the EC corresponds with the 
goals of the EU.  
 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis and summarises the findings. Finally, some suggestions 
for further research are given, and implications for the future for EU aid are discussed.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: IDEALS OR INTERESTS? 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the motives of aid allocation. First, the 
central theoretical concepts of the thesis, specifically aid, multilateral and bilateral donors, 
will be defined. Thereafter, the existing theoretical framework on donor behaviour will be 
explained and elaborated upon. These theories can be divided into three categories of donor 
motives: recipient needs, donor strategic and recipient merits, along with the category 
possibilities for influence, which explains who might influence the directions of aid. 
Furthermore, the normative perceptions of donors and how research has displayed differences 
in donor behaviour is discussed. Finally, critique to previous research will also be given a 
brief presentation.  
 
2.1 CONCEPT CLARIFICATION 
2.1.1 What is aid? 
“Aid” is a concept widely used in politics, the media and the like. But what does aid really 
entail? In order to clarify the focus of this thesis, it is important to explain what is meant by 
the concept of “aid”, and what type of aid I will be concentrating on in my research. Not all 
types of monetary disbursements are counted as aid. Aid is, by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
referred to as Official Development Assistance (hereinafter referred to as ODA or aid). 
According to the OECD  (2009a), aid is: 
 
Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare 
of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant 
element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows 
comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral 
ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and 
multilateral institutions. Lending by export credit agencies—with the pure purpose of export 
promotion—is excluded. 
 
Following this definition of aid, the subject of analysis is thus the amount of ODA flowing 
from the European Commission (EC) to a recipient country, leaving out aid flows that do not 
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qualify as ODA4. However, this thesis will also include the analysis of Official Aid (OA), 
which are flows that meet conditions of eligibility for inclusion in ODA, other than the fact 
that the recipients are Part II of the DAC list of aid recipients (OECD 2010a). OA is 
assistance primarily going to Eastern European and Central Asian countries in transition 
(Neumayer 2003: 41). Including OA in the analysis is necessary in order to get the full picture 
of EC aid allocation, especially because of the relationship the EU has had and still has with 
the democratic transitional countries in Eastern Europe.  
 
As this thesis analyses the allocation of aid over time, one must note that the definition of 
ODA has changed in two major respects since its inception. First of all, the activities to be 
considered as promoting economic development and welfare has changed since the definition 
of ODA was adopted in 1969 (IDA 2007: 32). It then allowed distinguishing development 
assistance from other flows without development objectives. The list of activities to be 
considered as promoting development and welfare has been widened substantially over time. 
Inter alia, cost of refugees in donor countries, costs of students from developing countries, 
internally paid interest subsidies, promotion of development awareness, and the recording of 
debt forgiveness on military debt along with other non-ODA debt were all added to the list of 
activities (IDA 2007: 33). Secondly, the DAC list of aid recipients has also been subject to 
changes (IDA 2007: 32). Until 2005, the list of ODA recipient countries only accounted for 
countries in the “part I” group of aid recipients, hence leaving out the “part II” countries. 
 
Table 2.1: Illustration of Part I and Part II countries5 
 Part I countries Part II countries* 
Type of aid  Official Development Aid (ODA) Official Aid (OA) 
Type of countries “Traditional” developing countries More advanced developing 
countries /Transition countries 
Included in aid 
research 
Always Sometimes 
Included in this 
analysis 
Yes Yes 
Source: Based on OECD 
*The Part II list of recipient countries was abolished in 2005. 
 
                                                 
4
 Aid flows that do not qualify as ODA are Other Official Flows and Private Flows. 
5
 It would have been interesting to include how many countries are listed as part I and part II countries, but as 
countries have been moved from one list to another, and even taken out of the lists, this is unfortunately not 
expedient. However, the better part of aid eligible countries are in the Part I list. 
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As illustrated in Table 2.1, the part I countries were “traditional” developing countries, which 
therefore were eligible to receive ODA. Table 2.1 also shows that the part II countries were 
“more advanced” developing countries, often Eastern European, whose aid was recorded 
separately as Official Aid (OA) (OECD 2009b). The DAC list of aid recipient countries has 
been reviewed every three years, so that only countries below the World Bank High Income 
Country threshold were included in the list of part I countries (OECD 2009b)6. However, 
since 2005, the DAC committee converted to using one single list of ODA recipients, 
abolishing the part II list. This was done because the part II countries became more 
prosperous, several of them joined the EU, and hence the aid flows to part II countries 
declined (OECD 2009b). 
 
The difference between these groups is important to note, considering that previous research 
on aid allocation has been based on this distinction between “part I” and “part II” countries. In 
some research, OA has been included, whilst in other it has been left out7. This leads to an 
inconsistency of previous research. Countries previously categorised as “part II” are now part 
of the total list of ODA recipients, and thus, newer research results may vary from research 
done before 2005. By studying aid to all recipients within both of the lists, one will get a more 
complete and realistic picture of how aid is allocated. For the case of the EU, the divide 
between “part I” and “part II” countries will conceal part of the picture on how money is 
allocated, as the part II countries mainly consisted of EU neighbouring countries.  
 
2.1.2 Categorising donors 
There exists a large variety of donors, who all have different donor behaviours based on their 
different objectives and motives. The traditional division of donors has been between bilateral 
donors and multilateral donors. Bilateral donors are countries who give aid directly to another 
country. Multilateral donors are composed by member countries, which distribute aid among 
several recipient countries. These multilateral donors include development banks such as the 
World Bank, the United Nations agencies, and regional groupings such as the EU and Arab 
agencies (UNESCO 2009).  
 
                                                 
6
  The World Bank High Income Country threshold was per capita annual income around USD 9 000 at the time. 
7
 In Neumayer’s (2003) analysis of bilateral and multilateral aid, OA was included, while in Berthélemy’s (2006) 
analysis of bilateral and multilateral donors and Olsen’s (2005) article on EU aid OA was excluded. 
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However, Berthélemy (2006: 77) argues that a four-fold division is more appropriate than the 
dichotomy of multilateral and bilateral donors. He bases his four categories on the donors’ 
composition, claiming that aid allocation may vary to a large extent from one donor group to 
another. The four categories are 1) bilateral donors, 2) multilateral donors with regional 
constituencies (such as the EC), 3) multilateral donors with regional clients (regional 
development banks) and 4) truly multilateral donors. 
 
By using the four-fold division of Berthélemy, it becomes easier to explain how the EC stands 
out from the “typical” multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and the United 
Nations. They are similar in some aspects as they are all composed by member states and are 
responsible for allocating their member states aid. Along with the World Bank and the United 
Nations, the EC is one of the world’s largest multilateral donors (IDA 2007: 4). Still, the fact 
that the EC is regionally based entails that it has security concerns, commercial interests, as 
well as a colonial heritage to consider. In this respect, the EC has features which are more 
typical to bilateral donors than to multilaterals.  
 
2.2 THEORISING DONOR MOTIVES 
The study of aid allocation searches to find which factors influence the donors in deciding 
why and to whom aid should be distributed. The relationship between donors and recipients is 
more complex than it may seem. Grilli and Reiss (1992: 471) argue that the geographical 
distribution of aid by industrial countries has complex roots, which are due to the 
multidimensional political economy that lies behind them. There are many factors that may 
influence the allocation of aid, such as the historical relationship between the donor and the 
recipient country, the donors need for raw materials, the needs for import or export markets, 
the poverty of the recipient country, and good policies and institutional stability of the 
recipient country. Within this field of research there has also been a focus on the difference in 
the distribution of aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, and how these donors seem to 
have different motives for allocating aid. A bilateral or multilateral donor can follow the goals 
set for aid allocation, which normally include recipient needs or recipient merits, or base their 
allocation on strategic interests. Below, Table 2.2 shows the theoretical categories for aid 
allocation motives that will be elaborated in this chapter, and that also will lay the basis for 
the dimensions used in the analysis. 
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Table 2.2: Comparison of theoretical categories 
 
 Recipient needs Donor-interests Recipient merits Possibilities for 
influence 
Category topics Poverty 
 
Commercial and  
geo-political 
interests 
Good governance Interests of major 
shareholders, 
aggregate of 
Member State 
interests 
Explanatory 
variables 
GDP per capita, 
child mortality, 
life expectancy 
Imports, exports, 
historical ties,  
security issues 
Rule of law, 
democracy,  
stable institutions, 
respect for human 
rights 
Commercial or 
political interests 
of member states 
or aggregate of 
member states 
interests 
What influences 
direction of aid 
Organisation’s 
goals 
Organisation’s 
common interests/ 
Member States 
interests 
Organisation’s 
goals 
Organisation’s 
common interests/ 
Member States 
interests 
 
2.2.1 The original two: Recipient-need and the donor-strategic models 
In their seminal work “A Foreign Policy model of U.S Bilateral Aid Allocation”, McKinlay 
and Little (1977) separated the goals of aid allocation into two alternative categories, the 
recipient-need based category and the donor-strategic category, which respectively have also 
been referred to as the idealist paradigm and the realist paradigm (Schraeder et al. 1998: 298). 
This distinction between two main aims of why and to whom donors allocate aid has since 
been much used to analyse aid allocation of both bilateral and multilateral donors. The first 
category, recipient-needs, is based on an altruistic view of the donor, where the donor gives 
aid based on the humanitarian needs of the recipient country. Humanitarian needs can be 
difficult to define and conceptualise, but generally they involve a measure of poverty in the 
recipient country, either per capita GDP or non economic measures such as child mortality, 
life expectancy and/or literacy8. The second category, donor-strategic, is based on the donor 
giving aid according to their own foreign policy interests and hence emphasises the 
instrumental utility of aid (McKinlay and Little 1977: 407). These interests can include 
security issues, the need for an export market or specific imports from the recipient country, 
the historical relationship between the donor and the recipient country, and power-political 
interests. 
                                                 
8
 An example of how this has been measured is the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI).  
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Maizels and Nissanke (1984) used the recipient-needs and donor-strategic categories to test 
whether there was a difference in the allocation of bilateral and multilateral donors. They 
found that bilateral donors tend to give aid according to the donor-strategic categories, 
whereas multilateral donors primarily focus on recipient-needs in their aid allocation. They 
also argue that aid allocation based on either recipient-needs or donor-strategies may have 
effects that complement the other category, though this is unintended. Maizels and Nissanke 
(1984: 437) state this through saying that 
 
Aid given with national interests taken into account (maintaining spheres of influence, political or 
military alliances or promoting their own export trade), may be used to accelerate the development 
process, but from the point of view of motivation this is an incidental effect. By contrast, aid given 
primarily for humanitarian or altruistic reasons, may – or may not – contribute to the foreign policy 
objectives of the donor, but this again would be an incidental effect. 
 
This shows that aid allocation based on donor interest or recipient needs may have effects that 
are not taken into consideration in the decision-making processes of the donor. However, 
these effects should not be taken into account when determining the donor motives, as they 
are indeed incidental. Still, this can render the process of understanding donor motives more 
complicated.  
 
Initially, the categories were tested in separate models. Measuring donor motives based on 
two models has been subject to criticism, as the motives of most donors arguably include both 
recipient-merit and donor-strategic interests (Neumayer 2003: 6). Grilli and Reiss (1992: 472) 
also argue that the models of “recipient-need” and “donor-interest” have shown rather modest 
results, because they are considered as competing and alternatives explanations. Their overall 
explanatory power has generally been limited and the statistical significance of some of their 
key variables has often turned out to be quite weak, not allowing clear-cut validation of 
hypothesis about the importance of the various determinants of aid distribution by country 
(Grilli and Reiss 1992: 472). Combining the variables in one model will therefore give more 
concise result. Therefore, these models have been elaborated, but the creation of these two 
basic models still stand as an important contribution to the literature of aid allocation.  
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2.2.2 The continuation of the basic models: recipient merits  
The seminal work of McKinlay and Little (1977) still holds its grounds, as most scholars still 
use the “recipient-needs” and “donor-strategic” categories when they analyse donors’ motives 
for aid allocation. However, there are new perspectives on why donors allocate their aid. The 
traditional models have therefore been elaborated as new aspects and categories of donor 
motives such as “recipient merits” and “influential shareholders” have become important to 
include in the analysis.  
 
The concept of “recipient merits” denotes a category which includes measures for how well 
the recipient country performs in governance and the like. This category is therefore also 
often referred to as “good governance”. The concept of recipient merits stems to a great extent 
from the quite influential work of the World Bank researchers Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
They found that the effectiveness of aid on economic growth is determined by the level of 
good policies and stable institutions of the recipient countries. Their work has had an actual 
affect on the aid allocation of multilateral aid donors, as donors themselves now claim that 
developmental criteria is given higher priority in aid allocation (Neumayer 2003: 6). It has 
thus become common for scholars to include variables for the category “recipient merits” to 
measure how great a role “recipient merits” play in the allocation of aid for different donors. 
However, this category can be difficult to measure, as “good governance” criteria are difficult 
to define (Berthélemy 2006: 78). Neumayer (2003: 1) argues that “good governance” can 
include variables such as democracy, respect for human rights, non-excessive military-
expenditures and the general quality of public sector management.  
 
Just like Berthélemy (2006), Ram (2003) discusses three aspects which may differ among 
bilateral and multilateral donors. These are donor motives, aid conditionality and closeness of 
the relationship between the donors and the recipients (Ram 2003: 96). Ram has thus left out 
the aspect of “recipient-need” and chosen to focus on the donor-recipient relationship. Ram 
argues that most bilateral donors choose not to focus on aid conditionality when allocating aid 
(Ram 2003: 97). Ram also argues that on the basis of the donor’s motives, the nature of the 
relationship between the donor and the recipient is likely to be different between multilateral 
and bilateral donors (Ram 2003: 98). 
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2.2.3 Possibilities for influence 
Another important continuation of the basic models is the inclusion of new variables to 
explain the category of decision-making strategies of multilateral donors. These variables are 
referred to as the influence of major shareholders and aggregate of member states’ interests. 
Measuring donor interests for multilateral donors must naturally differ from bilateral donors, 
as most multilateral donors are not geographically located or has commercial interests. 
However, this does not necessarily entail that the multilateral donors are autonomous or 
altruistic. Because multilateral donors are usually governed by their member states, 
Berthélemy (2006: 77) argues that they are far from independent actors, as their decisions are 
in the end made collectively by the governments that constitute their membership. Thus, the 
countries which are major shareholders in the multilateral organisations might influence the 
decision-making process of which countries should receive aid. The influence of major 
shareholders has been measured by variables such as commercial interests of the member 
states with the most votes. Still, the influence of each country is not always equal, as some 
member states have more votes than others. This argument assumes that the motives of aid 
allocation for the multilateral donors may be, to a smaller or greater extent, influenced by the 
preferences of one or several of their member states. Berthélemy argues that various attempts 
at testing the influence of multilateral agencies have shown that multilateral aid allocation is 
significantly correlated with United States commercial interests (Berthélemy, 2006: 99). For 
the case of the World Bank, where the votes are not distributed proportionally, Fleck and 
Kilby (2005) find that US commercial interests significantly influence financial flows by the 
World Bank to developing countries. For the EC, Berthélemy found that its aid allocation is 
significantly and positively correlated with British commercial interest (Berthélemy 2006: 97).  
 
The fact that the votes are distributed equally among the Member States in the EC, has lead to 
a variation of this theory, and Schneider and Tobin (2009) go a step further in trying to 
explain what determines the allocation of aid, by presenting their theory on aggregate of 
member states’ interest. As Berthélemy, they argue that the interests of the member states 
influence the decision-making of multilateral donors and that the patterns of aid allocations 
are strongly influenced by the political decision-making process within multilateral aid 
institutions (Schneider and Tobin 2009: 7). According to Schneider and Tobin (2009: 2), 
multilateral aid institutions not dominated by a single actor, such as the EU, should be more 
likely to distribute aid according to recipient needs. That implies that it is not the influence of 
one major shareholder that will decide the aid allocation, but the aggregate of interests of 
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several of the member states. Schneider and Tobin’s (2009) theory claims that the 
beneficiaries of aid from multilateral donors depend on the member states’ interests: whether 
the interests are heterogeneous or homogeneous. If the interests of the member states are 
heterogeneous, the poorest and neediest countries will receive the aid, because, if there are no 
aggregates of interests among the member states the donors tend to follow their stated goals 
for aid allocation. In contrast, if the interests of the member states are homogeneous, their 
interests will converge, and then aid will be given to countries that are strategically important 
to the politics and economy of the donor countries. Hence, their theory is related to the 
assumptions of Ram (2003) who believes that strategic considerations and self-interest is 
important for bilateral donors, because a multilateral donor with homogeneous interest will 
resemble a bilateral donor.  
 
This is confirmed by the statements of Schneider and Tobin (2009: 4), who argue that 
governments want their aid to go to countries that are strategically important, and 
consequently, the geographical distribution of bilateral foreign aid in most countries accords 
with national political, military and commercial interests. They believe that because of the 
strategic interests of bilateral donors, multilateral aid is more likely to benefit the neediest 
countries: 
 
A multilateral aid agency’s aim is to implement the development goals established by its member states 
and, accordingly, the multilateral agency should distribute aid based on economic needs rather than 
strategic interests (Schneider and Tobin 2009: 5). 
 
According to Schneider and Tobin’s (2009: 12) theory on multilateral aid allocation, the 
multilateral aid agent has an interest in implementing the official goal of the organisation, as 
long as the member countries have heterogeneous interests. Hence, EU multilateral aid should 
display strategic characteristics when there is homogeneous coalitions among Member States 
and when the EC cannot insulate itself from these homogeneous interests. Schneider and 
Tobin (2009: 12) test their theory of aggregate of member states’ interests on the EU as a 
multilateral donor, to if its Member States interests influence the decision-making process. 
They test whether homogeneous interests have influenced the aid allocation before and after 
the Cold War. This is due to their hypothesis that the EU Member States during the Cold War 
had heterogeneous interests and would thus be giving most of its aid to the poorest and 
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neediest countries in the ACP group9. After the iron curtain fell however, and the Eastern 
European countries became strategically important to the EU in both an economic and a 
political sense, the interests of the EU Member States converted to be more homogeneous. 
Hence, aid from the EU then fell for the poorest countries, and aid to the Eastern European 
countries rose (Schneider and Tobin 2009: 4). Their empirical work supports this hypothesis. 
 
Schneider and Tobin are not the only ones who assume that the Cold War has influenced the 
policy of aid allocation. McGillivray (2003) is among those who argue that the Cold War lead 
to changes in aid allocation. However, he believes that the end of the Cold War has lead to an 
increasing amount of aid to the neediest countries. He argues that aid has been transferred 
from strategic goals, because aid allocation was earlier based on ideological aspects such as 
assisting those who opposed the USSR, to the neediest countries (McGillivray 2003: 5). 
These arguments leads us to assume that the Cold War has had effects on the policy of aid 
allocation, but that it has influenced various donors in different ways.  
 
2.2.4 Theorising EU aid allocation 
There are relatively few theoretical contributions that aim at explaining the European 
Community’s policies toward the Third World (Olsen 2005: 577). The attempts made are 
primarily based on explaining which actors within the EU determine the aid allocation, rather 
than which factors that are important. One way of explaining the actors involved is through 
the theory of “Liberal intergovernmentalism” by Moravscik, which can be presented as a two-
step sequential model of preference formation. In the first step, national leaders aggregate the 
interest of their domestic constituencies and articulate national preferences regarding 
European development policies. In the second step, national governments bring their 
preferences to the intergovernmental bargaining table in Brussels where different agreements 
reflect the interests and the relative power of each Member State. In this latter step, 
supranational organisations such as the EC may exercise limited or a great deal of influence 
depending on the specific policy field (Olsen 2005: 578-579). 
 
Based on this theory, Olsen argues that the EU’s development policy can be explained by 
general European (national) interests, on one hand, and more narrow elite-based interests 
                                                 
9
 The term ‘poorest and neediest countries’ refers to the countries with the lowest GDP per capita, or which score 
the lowest on the PQLI index.   
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expressed in the bureaucratic policy-making on the other hand (Olsen 2005: 578). While the 
European interests explain the general policy and its changes, the minor and more specific 
parts of the policy and its changes can be explained by bureaucratic policy-making, which 
will reflect the interests of the narrow elites involved in the development policy (Olsen 2005: 
578).  
  
2.3 NORMATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF DONOR MOTIVES 
The categories for aid allocation motivations that are described also imply, implicitly or 
explicitly, some normative perceptions of what are “correct incentives” for aid allocation. 
Although the theoretical motives are divided into several categories, the normative approach 
is characterised by a two-fold perception of donor motives, namely altruism versus self-
interest. Donors who allocate aid primarily based on “recipient needs” are often described as 
altruistic. Stokke calls the altruistic donor behaviour “humane internationalism” (Stokke 1996 
in Siraj 2009). One is driven to perceive, however much implicitly, that the opposite motives 
for aid allocation, especially “donor interests”, therefore are decided by self-interest. Siraj 
(2009: 10) describes this as the “two extremes of aid”, where the first-mentioned is a “moral 
case, the obligation of the rich to help the poor in such ways as are open to them” and the 
latter being “bridgeheads for Northern exploitations”. Such a divide is somewhat extreme, and 
a donor basing its aid allocation on solely one of these is rather unlikely. Siraj (2009: 10) 
further argues that  “A donor country providing aid in a variety of developing countries across 
the globe cannot be driven by a single motive unless there is some benevolence”.  
 
This divide is transferred to the dichotomy of bilateral and multilateral donors. Most authors 
find that the determinants of bilateral and multilateral aid are quite different and one cannot 
explain the two together (Alesina and Dollar 2000: 35). The perception is that multilateral 
donors are more altruistic in their aid allocation than the bilateral donors, meaning that their 
aid allocation is first and foremost based on giving aid to the countries that need it the most. 
In general, previous research has shown that donor-strategic motives are usually typical for 
bilateral donors, while recipient needs are more typically the motive of multilateral donors 
(Berthélemy 2006: 78). For bilateral donors, self-interest motives have the most influence, 
and within this category, commercial interests predominates geopolitical motives (Berthélemy 
2006: 99). Berthélemy (2006: 88) argues that “this suggests that bilateral aid motives are, to a 
large extent, egoistic rather than altruistic”.  
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The multilateral donors however, are generally considered less hegemonic than bilateral 
donors (White, 1974 and Lister, 1997 in Siraj 2009: 7). Schneider and Tobin (2009: 6) argue 
that the empirical literature even claims that multilateral aid is more effective in reducing 
poverty than bilateral aid, because their conditionality carries more weight in the developing 
country’s policy-making. This is in line with Berthélemy’s (2006: 78) argument that 
multilaterals, especially the World Bank, give higher weight to good governance than bilateral 
donors, because they are more detached from vested interests that might influence the 
decisions of bilateral donors. However, there are some exceptions to this dichotomy of 
normative donor behaviour and the categories of altruism and self-interest are by no means 
exclusive10. In fact, research has shown that the combination of recipient needs and donor 
interests to quite an extent explains donor behaviour and the mix of donor interests and 
altruism in a donors aid allocations may vary from one set of circumstances to another, as 
well as over time (Selbervik 2003: 35). Multilateral donors also represent quite differing 
donor behaviours, which Berthélemy argues would justify studying them individually 
(Berthélemy 2006: 77). According to Siraj, the EU has a multilateral dimension when the aid 
is channelled through the EC. The fact that the EU provides most of its aid in grant-form also 
adds to the perceived benevolence (Siraj 2009: 7)11.  
 
2.3.1 Critique to previous research  
Research on aid allocation motives has shown differing results. Much of this is due to the 
issues of research being based on aggregates of aid, the already discussed problems of 
separation between “part I” and “part II” countries, different (statistical) methods, and to an 
inconsistency in choice of variables. The research based on aggregates of donor categories is 
meant to present a generalisation of the typical behaviours of multilateral and bilateral donors.  
But, as Berthélemy (2006) showed with the EC, there are great differences between the 
individual donors. These aggregates thus only show a general picture of a group’s donor 
behaviour, while important characteristics of the individual donor are camouflaged. Therefore 
it is necessary to analyse individual donors separately, to reveal these differences and explain 
the different donors’ behaviours based on their history with developing countries. Also, the 
presented categories can include a range of variables. The choice of variables has differed in 
                                                 
10
 According to Neumayer (2003) the Nordic countries tend to allocate aid based on recipient needs. 
11
 Grants are transfers made in cash, goods or services, for which no repayment is required (OECD 2010b). 
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previous research, along with differences in conceptualisations of these variables. Results will 
vary according to which variables are chosen.  
 
According to the traditional models on motivations for aid distribution, one would expect 
multilateral EC aid to follow a pattern in which the needs of recipient countries assume a 
larger relative weight than in the case of bilateral aid, with the help of which specific donor 
interests can be more easily and effectively pursued (Grilli and Reiss 1992: 471). This 
assumption makes the previous findings that EC aid corresponds relatively little neither to the 
needs nor the merits of the recipient quite striking. Berthélemy argues that the major influence 
in EC aid allocation is geopolitical, as it reflects the preferential treatment towards the ACP 
countries (Berthélemy 2006: 107). 
 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has clarified the concept of aid, and explained the need for including both 
Official Development Assistance and Official Aid in the analysis. Furthermore, the theoretical 
framework for analysing which factors determines the aid allocation of the EC has been 
presented. There are three main categories of donor motives, namely recipient needs, donor 
interests and recipient merits. A fourth category seeks to explain whose interests influence the 
decision-making, and hence the direction of aid allocations. Moreover, theory states that 
multilateral donors are more likely to allocate aid based on their goals, because they are 
supposed to be independent of member state interests. Multilaterals are therefore perceived to 
be more altruistic than their bilateral counterpart. Previous research has shown that these 
motives are weighted differently by the various donors, and that the aid allocation of the EC 
has tended towards being primarily influenced by donor interests. The method and data 
material used to investigate which theoretical categories determine aid allocation will be 
elaborated in the next chapter.  
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This thesis searches to analyse the European Union as a multilateral donor over time, in order 
to see which motives have influenced the allocations of the European Commission in different 
time periods. By comparing the development policies with the actual allocations of aid, one 
will see whether the EU actually follows its goals stated in treaties and agreements, or if 
strategic interests seem more important than obtaining the goals. This chapter presents the 
method of analysis and the data material used in this thesis. It commences by discussing the 
case study and justifying the choice of case. Furthermore it also discusses the research goal 
and the time aspect of the thesis. It then moves on to presenting the data, as well as discussing 
the issues of validity and reliability. Lastly, the dependent variable and the dimensions used in 
the analysis are presented and operationalised. 
 
3.1 DESIGN - QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY 
This thesis is a case study with a comparative approach. The analysis builds primarily on 
qualitative information from a variety of sources, but it will also include statistical data from 
the OECD which describes the direction of aid flows. According to Lumsdaine (1993: 134), 
whatever ends the donor has in mind, it should show up in where they spent the aid. Therefore, 
it is necessary to evaluate which groups of income, which region and which sectors received 
the largest portion of ODA. Pennings et al. (2006: 20) argue that a single case study can only 
be implicitly comparative, but not in terms of external validity. The comparative approach of 
this thesis lies in the examination of which groups of countries and which sectors that are 
prioritised in the European Commission’s aid allocation process, and what decides why these 
groups have been prioritised at a given time.  
 
3.1.1 The case study 
This thesis is an in-depth case study of the EU as a multilateral donor, as expressed through 
the aid allocations of the EC. As explained in the introduction, the case includes only 
multilateral ODA and OA flowing from the EC, thus leaving out all bilateral aid from the 
Member States of the EU. According to Ragin (2004: 125), case oriented researchers see 
cases as meaningful but complex configurations of events and structures. The historical and 
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political background of the EU is exactly that: complex. In order to study how such intricate 
contextual factors influence the aid allocation of the EC, the case study is an appropriate tool.   
 
A case study, according to Yin (2003: 37), searches to investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, where the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident. This case fulfils these criteria as the relationship between aid 
allocation and its determinants are neither given nor evident. Moreover, Gerring (2007) 
argues that a case study typically focuses on within-case variation, which for this analysis is 
the changing aid flows of the EC over time in light of possible determinants for these changes, 
and how these can be viewed in a theoretical perspective. While the EU as a multilateral 
donor is the case of the thesis, the units of analysis are the different groupings which receive 
aid from the EC.  
 
Skocpol (2003: 416) argues that “In-depth case explorations, (…) should not be considered a 
mere second best way to establish simple correlations among generally framed ‘dependent’ 
and ‘independent’ variables”. Furthermore, Skocpol argues that “Comparative historical 
analysis is a much more effective way to develop theoretically general and empirically rich 
causal knowledge than large-N studies that rely on unrealistic assumptions about the 
‘homogeneity of the territory’” (Skocpol 2003: 415). The case of the EU being as complex as 
it is, considering historical events, the goals and objectives for development policy will give a 
more empirically rich knowledge about the case than would a statistical analysis.  
 
Also, a case study allows detailed investigations and theoretically defined comparisons that 
enables the researcher to go beyond establishing simple correlations. Skocpol (2003: 416) 
argues that a case study approach is often better suited to available data than statistical 
methods that in practise make unrealistic demands on available sources of evidence. 
Therefore, a case study of the EU as a multilateral donor will facilitate a thorough 
investigation of the EC’s donor behaviour. However, the detailed explanations which are 
obtained in a case study involves trade-offs with the goals of theoretical parsimony (George 
and Bennett 2005: 31). Gerring (2004: 342) argues that a case study is an intensive study of a 
single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. Though not 
directly transferable to other donors, the knowledge attained from studying the EU as a 
multilateral donor might tell us something about the conflicting interests that other regionally 
based multilateral donors might face. However, the external validity of case studies are poorer 
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than for cross-case studies, as a single case study entails a lack of representativeness (Gerring 
2007: 31, 101). Instead of a limitation, this should be considered as a trade-off with statistical 
research, as choosing a qualitative approach with one single case will give empirically rich 
knowledge about the determinants for aid allocation of the EC. Furthermore, as discussed in 
chapter two, the research on aid allocation by studying aggregates of donors hides large 
variations among these. It is necessary to uncover the variations in the behaviour between 
donors, and avoid placing them in theoretically simplified groups. Therefore, this thesis seeks 
to display important differences between the EC and other multilateral donors. 
 
3.1.2 The case of the European Union as a multilateral donor 
Ragin (2004: 127) argues that social scientists study the cases they do because they in some 
way are historically, politically or culturally significant. Considering the EU’s increasingly 
important role both within Europe and on the international arena, the case undeniably fulfils 
these criteria. Furthermore, George and Bennett (2005: 83) argue that one should choose a 
case which is relevant to reaching the objectives of your study. Based upon these guidelines 
for case selection, there are several reasons for choosing the case of the EC in order to study 
the determinants for aid allocation. 
 
First of all, the case is chosen because of the EC’s status as one of the largest multilateral 
donors in the world today, accounting for about 40 percent of all multilateral flows 
(Berthélemy 2006: 77). The EC being a major multilateral donor entails that it distributes 
enormous amounts of money, which also brings great responsibility. Previous research (Grilli 
and Reiss 1992; Neumayer 2003; Berthélemy 2006) have shown that the EC tends to allocate 
aid more according to their own strategic interests than the needs of the recipient.  
 
Second, the EC is an interesting case because it differs from other large multilateral donors 
such as the World Bank and the United Nations (UN), in several respects, and because of its 
rather specific pattern of aid allocation, which does not resemble the typical multilateral 
donors. Based on the categories of Berthélemy’s (2006) donor types, the World Bank and the 
UN are categorised as truly multilateral donors, while the EC is categorised as a multilateral 
donor with a regional constituency. This entails that the donor has overarching, altruistic 
goals to follow, and that it is supposed to allocate aid according to these goals. At the same 
time it has interests similar to that of a bilateral donor, such as security interests, commercial 
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interests and ties to former colonies. This makes it necessary to evaluate whether the stated 
goals or its own self-interest takes precedence when aid is allocated. Just like the World Bank 
and the UN, the EU was also created in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the 
international climate was beneficial for cooperation and several new organisations were 
formed. However, the intention of its creation was not that of being an aid donor, and today it 
still has many tasks and responsibilities apart from the donor role.  
 
Third, the EU is an actor which has an increasing influence on the global arena. Development 
policy is an arena where rich and powerful organisations such as the EU have the possibility 
to influence developing countries, especially in terms of aid conditionality. Its position also 
enables it to take the role as a leading selfless and fraternal donor, and stand out as a good 
example. Also, development politics is an arena where the EU can play out its power politics. 
 
Lastly, the EC is a multilateral donor based on state membership, which is supposed to be 
independent from member state influence. As Schneider and Tobin argue (2009), multilateral 
donors are more likely to allocate aid according to their stated goals, and hence recipient 
needs, exactly because they are independent from state interests. Thus, it is necessary to 
investigate whether the Member States of the EU influence the aid allocation, or whether 
common EU interests or the stated goals determine the direction of aid. 
 
3.1.3 Understanding donor behaviour 
This thesis, in line with a growing literature on aid allocation, searches to find the reasons 
why a donor behaves in a certain manner, be it altruistic or acting from strategic interests. The 
goals of case-orientated investigations are often both historically interpretive and causally 
analytic (Ragin 1987: 35). However, causal complexity is not easily unravelled (Ragin 1987: 
26). The goal of this thesis is to understand the donor-behaviour of the EC by analysing the 
historical and political determinants and potential causes for changes in aid allocation. This is 
in line with the understanding that the goal of research should always be inference, and 
preferably causal inference. King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 75) argue that descriptive 
inference alone is often unsatisfying and incomplete. Much of the qualitative research done on 
the EU aid and its relationship with developing countries has been descriptive in nature. This 
analysis adopts a qualitative case approach, but searches to go beyond simple description. 
Research is meant to be explanatory, that is, making it possible to draw logical conclusions, 
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and explaining coherences. However, as King et al.(1994: 34) argue, the relationship between 
description and explanation is interactive, and one cannot construct meaningful causal 
explanations without good description. Therefore, in order to get a complete picture of the EU 
as a multilateral donor and the causal relationships, a thorough description of the EU’s history, 
development policy and goals, and the composition of the EC are necessary. One of the 
critiques against statistical analysis is also the difficulty of identifying causal mechanisms, 
whereas case studies have a better capacity for addressing causal complexity (Gerring 2007; 
George and Bennett 2005). In this case, the insight into the causal mechanisms which 
influence the motivation for aid allocation will be more valuable by applying a qualitative 
method. 
 
Qualitative research tends to be historically interpretive (Ragin 1987: 3). Usually, the 
combined effect of various conditions and their intersection in time and space, produces a 
certain outcome (Ragin 1987: 27). The aspect of history will be given much weight in the 
analysis of the EC’s aid allocations, as it is likely that changes both within the EU, along with 
international events might have influenced aid allocation. Skocpol (2003: 416) argues that 
comparative historical analysts “never assumes an identity of equivalence or 
representativeness of specific cases; instead the extent of similarity or difference between 
cases is considered a crucial part of the investigation”. The role of the EU as a unique donor 
has already been elaborated upon. Furthermore, the EU is also an increasingly important actor 
on the world stage. These factors make the study of the EC’s behaviour necessary in order to 
understand how its aid allocation affects the perception of the EU as a global actor.  
 
3.1.4 The time aspect 
The motives for providing development assistance change over time (Stokke 2005: 33).  
Including a time aspect in the analysis is therefore necessary as many events, both 
internationally and internally in the EU, as well as policy changes might have influenced the 
direction of aid throughout the history of the EU. Pierson (2003: 179) stresses the importance 
of the time aspect by stating that 
 
 (…) the causal processes claimed to generate outcomes of interest may of may not unfold over a short 
period. The outcomes themselves are equally subject to variation, with some transpiring over a very 
short time while others themselves out completely over a very extended period.  
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This entails that changes in the actual aid disbursements might not be visible immediately 
after a historical event or a policy change. Studying the EC’s aid allocation over time creates a 
more complete picture of a donor’s aid allocation policy, as it allows the researcher to observe 
changes over time. A natural starting point will therefore be the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
when the first initiative for European Community development assistance was taken. 
Evaluating the EC’s aid allocation over time allows us to view the changes within the EU and 
how this has affected the development policy. Considering that the European Community 
began as an economic cooperation between six countries, one cannot expect this cooperation 
to be leading within the area of development policy. As the size of the EU along with its 
ambitions on the world stage has grown, aid from the EC has increased, the development 
policy has become more ambitious, and more developing countries have been included. 
 
The data presented shows the ODA and OA allocations of the EU over time. Historically, 
there are some time points which can be regarded as possible decisive events. Potential events 
which might have influenced aid allocation are the enlargements of the European Community 
and later the EU, with the inclusions of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, Greece in 
1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1994, the inclusion of ten 
new member states in 2004 and lastly Romania and Bulgaria in 200712 . The economic 
situations of the countries which have been included in the EU have varied, as have their 
spheres of interest. The enlargements in 1973 were relatively rich countries, as opposed to the 
inclusions of Greece, Spain and Portugal. These countries were themselves in need of 
assistance, as they were relatively poor, as well as new democracies. The enlargement in 1995 
brought an additional three relatively rich countries, while the last two enlargements of 2004 
and 2007 consisted of many newly independent and poor countries. The inclusion of 
relatively poor countries brings possible implications for the aid allocation of the EC, both 
before and after the inclusions, as the need for assistance to the new Member States and 
Member State candidates would be considerable. As we will see in chapter four, the 
enlargements of the EU have also lead to changes in the development policies along with 
prioritised countries and regions. The inclusion of Great Britain to the European Community 
lead the development policy to expand to the Commonwealth, while the inclusion of Spain 
and Portugal entailed a greater focus on Latin America. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 as 
well as the international economic crises due to the oil crises of the 1970s and the 1980s also 
                                                 
12
 The ten new member states of 2004 were Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
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represents such possible decisive events, as these affected the international environment and 
economy. 
 
3.1.5 Complementing statistical research 
There will always be a trade-off regarding which research method is chosen, as the different 
methods have different qualities. However, it is important to note that when different methods 
are used on the same area of research, the studies will complement each other. Hence, by 
applying different research methods to the same field of research, one sheds light on different 
aspects of the topic. It is important with non-statistical thinking and research activity in all 
research domains, even those dominated by classical statistical data analysis (McKeown 1999: 
162). Considering that there is done a fair amount of quantitative research on this field, the 
qualitative method applied in this thesis will enrich the research field as the case of the EU as 
a multilateral donor is examined more in-depth. As previously mentioned, much of the 
existing qualitative research done has to a great extent been descriptive. Furthermore, 
previous research has to a great extent been based on the study of multilateral organisations in 
aggregated measures, with less focus on individual donors 13 . Studying the aggregate of 
multilateral donors will hide variations between the donors, but also variations within the 
single cases. Therefore, this thesis will look at the EU as a case which differs from the group 
of “multilaterals”.  
 
One of the advantages of case methods it the potential for  of achieving high conceptual 
validity (George and Bennett 2005). Concept validity is more easily preserved in a qualitative 
research design, as it does not have to operationalise variables in a simplistic way, which 
Skocpol argues often is necessary in large-N studies (Skocpol 2003: 416). Applying a 
qualitative design to this thesis allows for conceptual refinements (George and Bennett 2005: 
19). This entails a more precise interpretation of what the theoretical categories include for the 
case of the EC, and hence potential for achieving a higher level of validity, whereas a 
statistical approach would run the risk of “conceptual stretching” which would enhance the 
coverage of a concept, while giving it less precision (Sartori 1970: 1035). The concepts might 
be stretched so far that the variable no longer measures what one thinks one is measuring 
(Adcock and Collier 2001: 530). This is an advantage for qualitative research, as the 
                                                 
13
 Such as: Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Berthélemy (2006), and Neumayer (2003). 
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theoretical concepts can be defined and operationalised precisely, and not simplified in order 
to match the data available. 
 
By applying a qualitative approach as well as including quantitative measures, and in this 
manner thoroughly study the aid allocation motives of the EC over time and whether it 
corresponds with the EU’s development goals, this thesis searches to contribute to the 
literature and research on aid allocation. Though it would be useful for the analysis to apply 
statistical analyses in addition to the qualitative analysis, this would render the work too 
extensive and time consuming.  
 
3.2 DATA MATERIAL   
Ensuring the quality of data is important in many respects. King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 
23-26) present five guidelines on how to ensure and enhance data quality. These are 1) to 
record and report the process by which the data are generated, 2) in order to better evaluate a 
theory, to collect data on as many of its observable implications as possible, 3) maximise the 
validity of our measurements, 4) ensure that the data-collecting methods are reliable and 5) all 
data and analyses should, insofar possible, be replicable. The data material will be presented 
along the lines of these guidelines in the following paragraphs. 
 
The first guideline is to record and report the process by which the data are generated: Both 
quantitative and qualitative data are used in this thesis and there are three types of data 
sources which lay the basis for analysis. First of all, the analysis builds on existing academic 
research. There exists a fair amount of research on aid allocation, which makes theories and 
results from previous research available. Secondly, information on the EU and the EC, its 
goals, decision-making processes and history, are taken from their web-pages, reports, treaties 
and agreements. Much information on the donor can be found here. Thirdly, statistical data on 
aid allocation is drawn from the OECD.Stat database. This database presents data from 1960 
until 2008 on aid flows from different multilateral and bilateral donors to the respective 
recipient countries. As debated in the theory chapter, the OECD has until recently divided 
ODA recipients into two groups, part I and part II countries. Much of the previous research 
has solely focused on flows which qualify as ODA, and thus only the part I countries. The 
OECD.Stat database provides information on aid flows to both part I and part II countries, 
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which allows me to compare and evaluate a wider range of aid disbursements, and reveal the 
whole picture of what EC aid allocation consists of.  
 
The database also divides recipient countries into different income and regional groups, which 
makes it easier to study the aid flows compared to the donor goals and theoretical dimensions. 
The groupings are displayed in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Aid recipient groupings   
Regional groupings  Income-groupings Other groupings 
Africa, North of Sahara Least developed countries 
(LDC) 
African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) 
Africa, South of Sahara Other low income countries 
(OLIC) 
Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC) 
North and Central America Low middle income countries 
(LMIC) 
New Independent States (NIS) 
South America Upper middle income countries 
(UMIC) 
 
Middle East More Advanced Developing 
Countries and Territories 
(MADCT) 
 
South and Central Asia   
Far East Asia   
Oceania   
Source: Based on the groupings in OECD.Stat. 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, the income groupings are divided into: 1) Least developed countries, 2) 
Other low income countries, 3) Low middle income countries, 4) Upper middle income 
countries and 5) More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories. The regional 
groupings are divided into 1) Africa, North of Sahara, 2) Africa, South of Sahara, 3) North 
and Central America, 4) South America, 5) Middle East, 6) South and Central Asia, 7) Far 
East Asia and 8) Oceania. The database also provides a grouping for the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP), the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), and the New 
Independent States (NIS). These groupings are highly relevant in order to evaluate how aid 
flows from the EU are distributed according to the stated prioritised areas, and whether the 
directions of the disbursements have varied in different time periods. The aid flows to the 
different income groupings, regional and sectoral groupings will be presented in tables. The 
data which will be presented in the analysis use the numbers and groupings presented in the 
OECD.stat database. 
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The numbers for aid allocation to regions, income categories and ACP countries will be 
reported with a time interval of five years. The cooperation with development countries 
started with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the first year documented in the OECD database 
is 1960. This will therefore be the first reported year. The years of focus will therefore be 
every five years from 1960 until 2005, also including the last year with available data from 
the OECD database, 2008, which thus presents the last year of the analysis. For aid allocation 
to part II countries data is available from 1990-2004, as the part II list of recipients was 
abolished in 2005. Data for all the years will be presented. They will be presented in 
categories for Central Eastern and European Countries (CEEC), Newly Independent states 
(NIS), Most Advanced Developing Countries and Territories (MADCT) and total Official Aid 
(OA). For aid allocation according to sections, the availability of data is varying. Therefore, 
they will be presented with five year intervals, from 1985-2008, minus 1990, as there are no 
data for this year or time period. The fact that data is available for groupings such as regions, 
income categories, ACP countries, CEECs, NIS and different sectors enables comparison of 
the aid allocations between the alleged prioritised and non-prioritised groups. 
 
The second guideline is, in order to better evaluate a theory, to collect data on as many of its 
observable implications as possible. In order to fulfil this criterion, this thesis makes use of 
both qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative data I have used are mainly secondary, 
as I have investigated public documents such as the treaties of the EU14, The European 
Consensus on Development and The Millennium Development Goals. I have also made use of 
information on the web-pages of the EU, OECD, World Bank and the United Nations. Lastly, 
information from previous research, articles and books have been useful for understanding the 
EU as a multilateral donor. The quantitative data is the reported numbers on the OECD.Stat 
database, DAC2a and ODA by Sector (OECD 2010d). By using both qualitative and 
quantitative data, the data materials complement each other, and enrich the information in the 
analysis.  
 
The third guideline is to maximize the validity of our measurements. Ensuring validity is a 
crucial point in the research process. Validity concerns both concept validity and external 
validity. The challenges of ensuring external validity, which means that one should be able to 
generalise the results to other similar cases, has already been discussed. Concept validity 
                                                 
14
 ; The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), the Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht Treaty), the Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon.   
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concerns measuring what you are supposed to measure (Adcock and Collier 2001: 530; King 
et al. 1994: 25). In this thesis there are many concepts which are necessary to operationalise 
properly. As the dimensions used in the analysis are drawn from the theoretical concepts, it is 
essential to ensure that the concepts are the same. Validity is necessary in order to avoid bias 
in the results, and because good conceptualisation leads to a better formulation of theories 
(Adcock and Collier 2001: 532). One of the problems with studying ODA over time is the fact 
that what is included in the definition of ODA has changed. The same accounts for the 
countries included in the DAC lists of “part I” and “part II” countries. This was not changed 
until recently and hence previous research has counted some of the aid as “Official Aid” (OA) 
and by so leaving some countries out of the equation. Furthermore, I will use the theories on 
donor behaviour as the basis for the dimensions that I will apply in the analysis. Ensuring that 
these dimensions capture the meaning of the concepts like “recipient-needs”, “donor-interest”, 
“recipient-merits” and “strategic shareholders” is essential. These dimensions will be 
elaborated and clarified later in section 3.3.2.  
 
The fourth and fifth guidelines state that one should ensure that the data-collection methods 
are reliable, and that all data and analyses should, if possible, be replicable. Reliability means 
that applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure 
(King et al. 1994: 25). Hence, one can say that ensuring reliability is to ensure the potential 
for retesting. Using quantitative data from an acknowledged and respected source such as the 
OECD will enhance reliability, as will using sources such as original documents on treaties, 
agreements and such, as these can be found online and therefore are easily available.  
 
3.3 OPERATIONALISING THE VARIABLES 
A case is comprised of several dimensions (variables), each of which is built upon an 
observation or several observations (Gerring 2004: 342). This last section will present the 
variables or dimensions that are used in the analysis. First the dependent variable is presented 
and operationalised, before I explain the dimensions and how one can evaluate whether these 
have influenced the direction of aid flows. I will also discuss potential problems of the 
concepts. 
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3.3.1 Dependent variable – development aid 
The dependent variable is, as noted in the theory chapter, development aid. This variable is 
measured in Official Development Aid (ODA) and Official Aid (OA). The measures are taken 
from the database OECD.Stat, DAC2a and ODA by sector. This variable is the most obvious 
choice, as I analyse the motives for development assistance flows to different recipients. The 
availability of data for this variable is also very good, as ODA-flows from a wide range of 
donors to different recipients and groups of recipients are documented in the OECD.Stat 
database from 1960 onwards. OA-flows are available in the same database from the 1990s 
until 200415. This measure has also been used as a dependent variable in earlier research. For 
example, Berthélemy’s (2006) dependent variable was the commitment of aid from the 
various donors to the different recipients. It is also important to note that the types of aid in 
OECD.Stat are presented as both commitments and disbursements. This thesis presents the 
“disbursements” variable from the OECD, because disbursements “record the actual 
international transfer of financial resources”, as opposed to using the “commitments” variable, 
which captures the obligation a donor has made to donate a certain amount of aid to a 
recipient country (OECD 2010c, 2004). The aid flows are presented as current US dollars. 
 
3.3.2 Dimensions for analysis 
Table 3.2: Dimensions drawn from the theoretical categories 
Theoretical categories/dimensions for analysis Explanatory factors of the dimensions 
Donor-interests Colonial ties 
Commercial interests 
Security issues 
Geographical proximity 
Recipient needs Poverty reduction 
Goals 
Recipient merits Rule of Law 
Human Rights 
Democracy 
‘Good governance’ 
Possibilities for influence Influential shareholders 
Aggregate of member states interests 
 
                                                 
15
 Because, as noted in chapter two, the part II list of recipients was abolished in 2005.   
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Table 3.2 shows us which dimensions the theoretical categories can be divided into. The 
analysis will be organised along these dimensions, which are the explanatory factors for the 
direction of aid flows. As shown in the theory chapter, donor motives have been divided into 
three categories, namely recipient need, donor-interest and recipient merits. Furthermore, a 
fourth category, possibilities for influence, which aims at explaining which actors influence 
aid allocation, is added. This category seeks to investigate whether the interests of Member 
States or common EU interests influence the aid allocation. As the concepts used in the theory 
chapter are quite wide, and hence might include several explanatory factors, I will, where 
suitable, break these down to more narrow dimensions.  
 
The first dimension is focus on recipient needs. As explained in the theory chapter, recipient 
needs normally include aid to the poorest and neediest countries. However, what is to be 
regarded as the “poorest and neediest” countries is more difficult to define. Information on 
how and whether the EU focus on the “poorest and neediest” countries is what will be 
referred to as the “goals” of the donor’s development policy. These goals can be found in the 
treaties of the EU, as well as in internal and international agreements. The set goals and 
objectives of the EU will therefore be analysed to find out what make up the primary areas of 
priority for the donor. Is the EU focusing mainly on the poorest countries, or are certain 
geographical areas prioritised?  
 
The second dimension is donor-interest. This dimension holds many potential explanatory 
factors. As seen in the theory chapter, this category has often been divided into “geopolitical 
interests” which includes security issues, and “commercial interests”, which captures the 
possibilities for economic gain. Berthélemy (2006: 81) argues that one can analyse 
geopolitical interests by linking historical and geopolitical factors, i.e. the colonial legacy and 
geographical proximity, which could be considered as exogenous factors. Aid may also be 
used to deepen the commercial linkages with a recipient, and not only political alliances 
(Berthélemy 2006: 82). By studying the history of the donor, one can find geographical areas 
or groups which might have been treated preferentially, either because of geo-political factors 
such as geographical proximity or security interest, or because of commercial interests. The 
self-interest of the donor explains the possibility for the donor to gain something from 
allocating aid to other countries, be it access to raw materials or potential for increasing 
security and political stability in fields of interest. Theoretically, this concept has both been 
 34 
called “self-interest”, “strategic interests” and “donor-interest”. In the analysis it will be 
referred to as strategic interests. 
 
The third dimension is recipient merits. As noted in the theory chapter, what can be regarded 
as recipient merits is good governance, stable institutions, democracy and human rights. As 
with the dimension of recipient needs, the goals and treaties of the EU’s development policy 
will form the base for understanding what the EU considers as recipient merits. Recipient 
merits are difficult to measure, as stable institutions and good governance are concepts that 
are rather loose and undefined. The EU’s on recipient merits will be assessed by analysing 
how the EU has incorporated recipient merits criteria into its programmes, and whether 
conditionality has been used if these criteria are not met.  
 
The last dimension is possibilities for influence. The theory chapter showed that this category 
both included “influential shareholders” and “aggregate of member states’ interests”. Theory 
claims that “influential shareholders” are countries or members of the multilateral 
organisation that have the power to influence the decision-making process, and hence the 
direction of aid flows. The aid allocation will thus be influenced by the strategic interest of 
certain member states. In previous statistical research, this category has been based on 
analysing the correlation of multilateral aid allocations with the export intensity of their 
principal shareholders (Berthélemy 2006: 96). This thesis evaluates how the scope of 
countries included in the EU development policy has been influenced by specific Member 
States. It also analyses whether certain areas which are of interest to specific donors have 
received preferential treatment throughout history. By studying the composition of the 
decision-makers and the decision-making processes, one can assess whether there are, or have 
been, opportunities for single Member States to exercise influence.  
 
The theory of aggregate of member states’ interests assumes that the combined geo-political 
or commercial interests of the donor’s member states have taken precedence over following 
the goals for development policy, as Schneider and Tobin hypothesised happened in the EU 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The influence of aggregate of member states’ interests is 
evaluated by investigating what can be considered as common “European interests” across 
Member States. Such interests might have introduced new policies that have taken precedence 
over the objectives and goals. Hence, by evaluating historical events which might have been 
crucial to the EU’s common interests, while at the same time evaluating how well the goals 
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are followed, it is possible to observe whether the aggregate of member states’ interests have 
influenced the aid allocation.   
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4. CHANGING PRIORITIES  
This chapter gives a brief historical presentation of the evolution and development of aid 
policy. The history of the EU’s aid policy will be particularly discussed. In order to see which 
trends may have influenced the aid allocations of the EC, the international and internal aspects 
are explained separately.  
 
4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF AID POLICY 
 
Aid architecture can be defined as the set of rules and institutions governing aid flows to developing 
countries. While aid has an architecture, it has no single architect (IDA 2007: 1).  
 
4.1.1 Emergence of development cooperation 
The emergence of international aid policy and institutions has not happened overnight, but has 
resulted from decisive events since World War 2 (WW2). Stokke (2009) shows that Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) has changed and evolved as a response to the international 
political and economic environment during the decades from the 1940s to the 2000s16. Most 
fundamentally, the policy of donating aid emerged as a response to 1) the decolonisation 
process and 2) the needs that were the results of the emerging Cold War (Stokke 2009: 4). 
The Cold War period, from the end of WW2 until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, has been 
described as one of the main “architectures” of aid policy (IDA 2007: 1), meaning that the 
political climate in this era heavily influenced international development policy. 
 
Also, in the aftermath of WW2, several new international institutions were established, many 
of which were inspired by the success of the Marshall Plan. Amongst them, the creation of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were important to the 
institutionalisation of aid policy (Stokke 2009: 6)17. The World Bank was established already 
in 1944 to help rebuild Europe after the war. It was also after WW2 that one of the greatest 
contributors to aid in the world today, the European Economic Community (now the EU), saw 
the light of day. The US administration along with other major western governments were the 
                                                 
16
 For a thorough overview of the history of aid, see Olav Stokke (2009). 
17
 The World Bank and the IMF are known as the Bretton Woods institutions after the conference meeting of 43 
countries in Bretton Woods, USA, in July 1944. They were established to help rebuild the post-war economy and 
promote international economic cooperation (Bretton Woods Project 2007). 
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main enthusiasts, architects and initiative takers of these new institutions (Stokke 2009: 7). 
Donating economic aid to developing countries did not become common in the way we know 
it today until after WW2, but it was first during the 1960s foreign aid “took off”, meaning that 
aid amounts increased substantially (Boone 1996). 
 
The primary focus of development policy in its emergence was reconstruction and technical 
assistance, not direct monetary aid. The intention of development aid was to help developing 
countries industrialise, and thus reduce poverty and enhance economic growth (Boone 1996: 
289). Stokke (2009: 43) states that the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) 
recognised the responsibility of the UN to assist some member states by providing expert 
advice “in the various fields of economic, social and cultural development”, and that this was 
justified by the recognition that development was important for world peace and prosperity. 
The main objective behind the development assistance was to promote economic and social 
development in “underdeveloped” countries and regions. Towards the end of the 1940s, the 
UN became especially important in the establishment of the idea of development assistance 
and in the institutionalisation of aid (Stokke 2009: 29). The focus eventually shifted from 
technical assistance to economical aid.  
 
However, Stokke (2009: 44) also argues that the mission of providing development assistance 
was not merely idealistic, as the UN was a “major arena for power politics and the pursuit of 
foreign interests”. One should keep in mind that the UN was created in the aftermath of WW2, 
a time when there were strong tensions between the East and the West. Within this context, 
“aid became an instrument for fortifying old relations, establishing new loyalties, containing 
the influence of rivals, and ensuring the superpowers’ economic and strategic interests and 
ideological concerns” (Stokke 2009: 44). Siraj (2009: 5) argues that the Marshall plan, in 
addition to helping rebuild Europe, is also associated with the US trying to steer Europe away 
from Communism. He further argues that the Marshall plan therefore inspired the donors to 
pursue some agenda, hidden or explicit, which might not coincide with the interest of the 
recipient. 
 
The two major trends that characterised the period of 1940s and 1950s, the decolonisation and 
the emergence of a bipolar international system, continued on into the 1960s. In this decade, 
the tensions and the increasing rivalry between the East and the West continued to affect, 
motivate and form the major donors’ aid policy (Stokke 2009: 7). In 1960 the Development 
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Assistance Group (DAG) of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
came into being, to help coordinate and facilitate consultation among the major western 
donors about assistance to developing countries (Stokke 2009: 7)18. In the 1970s, a separate 
target of spending 0.7 percent of GDP on ODA by the middle of the decade was set (Stokke 
2009: 10). Interestingly, this is one of the aims of the Millennium Development Goals today, 
set to be achieved in 201519. This decade also brought a focus on pro-poor policy, which 
meant that the donors’ aims and objectives were set to direct aid towards the poorest and 
neediest countries. In the 1970s the focus also turned from simply striving to achieve 
economic growth, to more focus on the considerations of improving concrete areas such as 
health, education, and income distribution (Aid Watch 2009). In the 1980s, ODA had a 
downfall caused by international economic crisis, which turned into a development crisis. 
Stokke (2009: 11) argues that this development crisis was caused by the fact that:  
“Stagflation and a changed ideological current in many western countries led to increasing 
protectionism and scarce resources for aid”. The solution for these problems led to what is 
called the first generation of aid conditionality, which entailed that the Bretton Woods 
institutions had to make the developing countries agree to a structural adjustment programme, 
because of the developing countries’ problems with paying their debts. These incentives were 
a fundamental change in the policy of ODA.  
 
4.1.2 Development policy in a new world order 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to what the International Development Assistance 
(IDA) refers to as the “Post Cold War Architecture”, which is still prevailing today (IDA 
2007: 1). With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, what in chapter two is referred to as 
“recipient merits”, such as good governance, human rights and democracy, gained ground in 
aid allocation (Stokke 2009: 12; IDA 2007: 38). These conditions are also referred to as 
second generation conditionality. In this type of conditionality, aid can be seen as a reward or 
a ‘carrot’ when the recipient country adopts donor approved policies (Riddell 1999: 324). The 
emphasis on second generation conditionality can be seen through the 1993 DAC presentation 
of an orientation on “Participatory Development and Good Governance”, where the DAC 
countries acknowledged these principles and objectives as “areas for action” (OECD 1993: 2). 
                                                 
18
 In 1961 the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation was superseded by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Development Assistance Group was superseded by 
the Development Assistance Committee. 
19
 The Millennium Development Goals will be discussed further in section 5.3.3. 
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It stated that: “It has become increasingly apparent that there is a vital connection between 
open, democratic and accountable systems of governance and respect for human rights, and 
the ability to achieve sustained economic and social development” (OECD 1993: 2).  
 
Therefore, it was acknowledged that participatory development and good governance must be 
central concerns in the allocation and design of development assistance (OECD 1993: 2). In 
this decade, fighting poverty became the overall theme of development assistance. In the 
1990s, the World Bank’s and the IDAs role as the main channel for multilateral ODA was 
surpassed by the EC and the United Nations (IDA 2007). However, alleviating poverty met 
new challenges, as intra-state wars heavily influenced and affected the direction and use of 
ODA. Resources were turned from social and economic development to emergency and 
security issues such as relief assistance to refugees, and the resolution and prevention of 
conflicts (Stokke 2009: 13). The focus was also brought to involving the developing countries 
in the global economy. In 2000, new efforts were made in terms of coordinating and setting 
new targets for international development policy. With the UN Millennium Summit, the heads 
of state of 147 countries were gathered along with other major aid-providing institutions. This 
resulted in the creation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, from which the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were established (Stokke 2009: 14). The MDGs set 
out to eradicate poverty within 2015. Stokke (2009: 15) argues that “(…) the commitments 
made in the United Nations Millennium Declaration are the world’s biggest promise, and 
attaining the results contained in the Millennium Development Goals is the world’s biggest 
challenge”. 
 
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF EU AID POLICY  
The European Economic Community was also created in the time period after WW2, 
primarily as an economic cooperation between the six member states: France, Germany, Italy 
and the Benelux countries. At its emergence, the countries of the European Community were 
themselves receivers of development assistance. As the countries rebuilt after the destructions 
of WW2, and the European Economic Community grew in scope and scale, the European 
Commission and its Member States became important aid donors themselves. 
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4.2.1 Funding of development aid 
The EU development aid is divided into two main categories, both of which are administered 
by the Commission in Brussels (Olsen 2005: 574). The first category is the African Caribbean 
and Pacific group (ACP), while the second category covers the rest of the world; Latin 
America, the Mediterranean, Asia and Europe (Olsen 2005: 574). The latter category of the 
Community’s aid is financed by the ordinary budget and is therefore subject to the annual 
political infighting. The ACP group and the Other Countries and Territories (OCT) are 
covered by the European Development Fund, which is the main instrument for providing 
Community aid for development cooperation to these areas. The European Development Fund 
was set up in 1958, whose disbursements are managed by the Commission, under supervision 
by the Council (Neal 2007: 179; European Commission 2009a). It is not part of the 
Community’s general budget, but the contributions are made by the Member States of the EU 
(Europedia 2010). It is the aim of the common aid policy to secure the gradual and 
harmonious integration of the developing countries into the world economy. The fight against 
poverty also has high priority, along with the aim to promote democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law (Olsen 2005: 537).  
 
4.2.2 Preserving colonial ties 
The colonial past of Europe has been of great importance to the EU development aid policy.  
In the time after WW2, the Member States agreed to assist their former colonies economically, 
especially in Africa, as this would help to secure their independence (European Commission 
2007: 4). The formal cooperation started as early as the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which in 
articles 131 and 136 recognised the obligations of Member States to help their colonies 
economically, along with arranging for an association of the former French and Belgian 
Colonies with the European Community (Neal 2007: 179; Van Reisen 2007). The cooperation 
was based on the principles of association as opposed to assimilation, and on non 
discriminatory trade between access by other European Member States (Van Reisen 2007: 33). 
There was also established a free trade area between the European Community and the 
colonies, giving the right to establishment to firms and nationals from all parties.  
 
The Yaoundé Conventions from 1963 to 1975 arranged for a cooperation between the 
European Community and 18 former colonies in the ACP group, and it was signed to cover 
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aid disbursements by the European Development Fund over the next five years (Neal 2007: 
179). The notion “ACP-states” comes from the “ACP group of states” formally established in 
1975 with the Georgetown Agreement, which was initially signed by 46 African, Caribbean 
and Pacific states (European Union 2010). The relationship between the EU and the ACP 
countries has grown and strengthened during the years since the Yaoundé treaty, as the 
number of Member States in the EU has increased, and thus the number of ex-colonies, 
trusteeships, or overseas territories for which the EU Member States feel some responsibility 
(Neal 2007: 180). Through the Yaoundé Conventions (1963-1975), Lomé Conventions (1975-
2000) and the Cotonou agreement (2000-2020), the ACP-EC cooperation has been formalised, 
and the number of member states in the ACP group has grown to 79 members, 78 of which 
has signed the Cotonou agreement (European Union 2010)20. The members of the ACP group 
are deemed eligible for preferential treatment in trade and aid (Neal 2007: 180).  
 
One of the principle reasons why the relationship to the developing countries was of such 
importance for the European Community was the fact that the European countries needed raw 
materials and resources for the development of Europe. Its export markets and its labour 
forces were also of vital importance for the EU. Van Reisen (2007: 59) also argues that “it has 
been recognized since the inception of the EU that its prosperity is dependent on and closely 
associated with the EU’s ability to cooperate with the countries of the South”. Further, Van 
Reisen argues that “the EU is dependent on the South if it wants to fulfil its aspirations to 
becoming a global player” (Van Reisen 2007: 59).  
 
Though the non-associated countries in Asia and Latin America were included in the 
European Development policy in 1976, the resources of this budget line remained limited in 
scope (Van Reisen 2007: 42). However, when the accession agreements with Spain and 
Portugal were signed, this had a provision that aid to Latin America would be increased (Van 
Reisen 2007: 45). With the enlargement of the European Community to include UK, Ireland 
and Denmark, even more countries were included in the ACP-group. This represented a 
turning point of the European Community’s development assistance as the ACP-EC 
cooperation grew to become quite extensive. Furthermore, agreements signed with the 
Mediterranean countries and the successful negotiations on the Lomé Convention now 
ensured that the whole of the African continent was embraced (Van Reisen 2007: 44).   
                                                 
20
 Yaoundé I (1964-9), Yaoundé II (1969-74), Lomé I (1975-9), Lomé II (1980-4), Lomé III (1985-9), Lomé IV 
(1990-4), Lomé IV revised (1995-9), Cotonou I (2000).  
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The relationship between the EU and the ACP group has changed and evolved with the 
different conventions and agreements. First, the oil crisis in the 1970s forced the European 
Community to re-evaluate the relationship with the ACP countries. During the 1970 the 
Community’s development policy also took on an increasingly global perspective (Van 
Reisen 2007: 43). The relationship with the developing countries now became a part of the 
European economic strategy, because the European Community still needed to import energy 
and raw materials. Second, in 1988, the European Parliament insisted on increasing resources 
for the aid programmes, and that financial and technical assistance should be strictly poverty 
oriented so that the neediest countries would benefit the most (Van Reisen 2007: 45-46). 
Third, an emphasis on human rights, good governance and democracy was included in the 
Lomé IV Convention of 1990. Also, the Cotonou agreement established  poverty eradication 
as the principal objective, assigned a greater role to the participation of civil society as well as 
reinforced the political dimensions of relations between the ACP countries and the EU (Van 
Reisen 2007: 56). 
 
4.2.3 Inclusion of the non-associated countries  
Although the ACP group has received much attention in EU development policy, non-
associated countries have also been included. The history of the EU’s involvement with non-
associated countries dates back to the 1970s, when a global development policy was launched 
by the Commission through the Paris Declaration of 1971. It involved the broadening of 
policies’ range implemented at the time, in addition to a call for coordination and 
harmonisation with Member States’ individual strategies (Birocchi 1999: 4). The first piece of 
legislation dedicated to non-associated countries was the Council Regulation of 1981 on 
financial and technical aid (Birocchi 1999: 2). Also, the European Community initialised a 
general system of preferences in 1971. This instrument would provide global application of 
preferential market access for imports from the associated countries. Though this measure was 
intended to expand the development policy from being restricted to merely European-African 
cooperation, the increased use of instruments granting preferential treatment quickly eroded 
their value to the partner-countries (Van Reisen 2007: 42).  
 
 In 1984, with the accession negotiations with Spain and Portugal, the Commission made 
proposals to substantially increase the budget for assistance to non-associated countries, 
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including the Mediterranean countries (Van Reisen 2007: 45; 2002: 12). There were made 
proposals for increases in this budget line, despite the fact that the existing resources already 
were not fully utilised (Van Reisen 2002: 12). Furthermore, in 2000, the three EU institutions 
adopted the first fully-fledged policy in development cooperation for all developing countries. 
It stated that “the main objective of community development policy must be to reduce and 
eventually, to eradicate poverty” (Van Reisen 2007: 56). However, Van Reisen  (2007: 56) 
argues that at the same time, there was a rival idea that EU development policy should be 
focused on and limited to Africa. This idea seemed to gain ground in the allocation of aid and 
the implementation structures.  
 
According to Birocchi (1999: 2), the EU’s approach and attitude toward the Asian emerging 
economies have been mainly defensive, due to the fear of aggressive commercial competitors. 
The aid policy of the EU has also shown defensive features towards the Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs) such as Brazil. Still, aid toward Asian and Latin America (ALA) has been 
limited in scope, especially if compared with the ACP.  
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) were 
also included through the Phare programme, which commenced in the early 1990s21. Cox and 
Chapman (2000) argue that this programme marked the beginning of significant EC 
cooperation with this region. Furthermore, the New Independent States (NIS) of the former 
Soviet Union were embraced by the EC development policy through the Tacis programme of 
1991  (Cox and Chapman 2000)22. 
 
4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter shows that the policy of development assistance emerged after WW2, and its 
initiation was far from cautious. Since then, decisive historical events such as wars, economic 
crises and changes in the international political climate have affected the allocations of ODA. 
Two major trends have influenced the international climate for ODA; The first trend being the 
                                                 
21
 The Phare (Assistance for Economic Restructuring in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe) 
programme became operational in January 1990 on the basis of a Council Regulation to support the process of 
transition to market-orientated economy, originally intended for Poland and Hungary, but later came to include 
the Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, the former GDR, Romania and the former Yugoslavia. In 1991 it was 
extended to include Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Cox and Chapman 2000: 11). 
22
 The Tacis (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) was formally established by Council 
regulation No 2157/91 of 15 July 1991, and also included Mongolia (Cox and Chapman 2000: 13). 
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decolonisation process and the second trend being the Cold War period. ODA policy has also 
changed from focusing primarily on technical assistance, to having a more pro-poor focus. 
This historical presentation also shows that there are two generations of aid conditionality. 
The first generation aid conditionality was that the development countries needed to agree to a 
structural adjustment programme, while the second generation aid conditionality was the 
donors’ focus on good governance, human rights, democracy and the like in the recipient 
countries. The history of the European aid policy has shown a great focus on cooperation with 
the associated countries. However, the historical relations do not solely entail that the EC’s 
aid allocation is based on strategic interests, as the development cooperation has grown to 
include developing countries throughout the whole world. The next chapter will explain how 
the development policy of the EU has changed and evolved throughout the same time period, 
and how the decision-making process of the development policy is laid out. 
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5. ASSESSING GOALS AND COMPOSITION 
This chapter commences with a brief introduction on the composition and decision-making 
process of the European Commission, which is the body in the EU responsible for allocating 
the EU’s multilateral aid. This will show whether any specific actors have a greater possibility 
of influencing the decision-making than others. The composition of the EC and possibilities 
for Member States to affect the decision-making processes will be necessary to evaluate 
whether the EC is truly independent from its Member States’ interests. Next, a presentation of 
the stated goals and objectives of the development policy of the EU as a whole will be given. 
These goals are divided into those which are agreed upon in the treaties of EU, internal 
agreements, and international agreements which are applicable to the EC. The donor’s stated 
goals and objectives for aid allocation and aid effectiveness will show how recipient-need 
oriented the EC’s intentions are, as well as determining how the EC defines “poverty oriented 
aid”. Knowledge about goals and composition, along with the history presented in chapter 
four, is vital to understanding the development of the EC’s aid allocation, and enables us 
continue with the analysis.  
 
5.1 THE EU’S TWO-FOLDED ROLE  
 
Through aid, the EU has acquired a unique international role, one which reflects its self-imposed 
responsibility to share the benefits of development with the world's poorest countries (Lambert 1997: 2). 
 
One might say that the EU has a two-folded role when it comes to aid; the EU as a regionally 
based organisation with geo-political and commercial interests, and the EU as a multilateral 
donor with overarching goals and objectives. First and foremost, the role of the EU does not 
consist solely of being a multilateral donor. Because of its status as a large regionally based 
organisation which includes an ever increasing number of policy areas, it is natural to assume 
that the EU also wants to preserve its global interests in the aid allocation policy. Unlike the 
World Bank and the UN, the EU has a regional constituency, which makes it more probable 
that it has clearer cut strategic interests, such as commercial and security interests. This is the 
primary factor that separates the EU from other substantial multilateral donors. Although the 
number of Member States in the EU is lower than the World Bank and the UN, the ODA 
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flows from the EC has surpassed them (Schneider and Tobin 2009: 3)23. As argued in chapter 
two, multilateral donors are less likely to be influenced by strategic interests and more likely 
to be affected by recipient merits and recipient needs. Theory assumes that a multilateral aid 
donor’s aim is to implement the development goals established by its member states and, 
accordingly, the multilateral donor should distribute aid based on economic needs of the 
recipient country rather than its own strategic interests (Schneider and Tobin 2009: 5). The 
EC as a multilateral donor is meant to be independent of its Member States, and also has a 
stated development policy to follow. Thus one should expect that EC aid is to be more 
focused on recipient needs, as multilateral aid agencies were established to support the 
economic development of the poorest and neediest countries, and their missions and goals 
reflect this approach (Schneider and Tobin 2009: 8). The next sections will elaborate on 
whether the composition of the EC creates possibilities for Member States to influence the 
direction of aid, and the goals and objectives set in the development policy of the EU. 
 
5.2 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
As mentioned in the introduction, the European Commission is the EU’s executive arm, 
which is seated in Brussels. It is responsible for implementing the decisions of the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers, through implementing its policies, running its 
programs and spending its funds (European Union 2009). The EU is governed by the Council 
resolutions which define strategic poverty alleviation and people oriented goals (Cox et al. 
2000: 37). The Council of Ministers consists of ministers from each Member State. It has co-
decision with the European Parliament on legislation and the annual budget, and it has a 
special focus on development policy twice a year. The European Parliament consists of 758 
members elected by 27 Member States, and it has the right to co-decision with the Council on 
development legislation and the annual EU budget. However, it is the Commissions 
responsibility to manage important instruments relating to the developing countries (such as 
trade and aid) (World Bank 2009).  
 
                                                 
23
 The EU has 27 Member States, whereas the World Bank has 186 Member States, and the UN has 192 Member 
States.  
 47 
5.2.1 The special role of the European Commission  
The Commission is responsible for representing the EU on the international arena and, among 
other things, negotiates international agreements on behalf of the EU. The Commission’s role 
in the EU’s development policy is formally governed by the “campaign against poverty” 
mandate enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and the Council resolutions of 1993 on the fight 
against poverty, and of 1996 on Human and Social Development (Cox et al. 2000: 25). The 
members of the Commission are called “commissioners”, and the Commission is composed 
by one commissioner from each Member State. The commissioners are not elected, but 
appointed by the Member States, and the commissioners pledge to be independent of their 
governments. Furthermore, they are committed to act in the interests of the Union as a whole, 
and not take instructions from their national governments (European Union 2009). The 
commissioners are often portrayed as unaccountable technocrats, because they are unelected 
(Peterson 2006: 81). Hence, it is difficult to hold them responsible if the policies are not 
followed, though the EC has become increasingly accountable to the European Parliament 
(Peterson 2006: 97). Despite this independence, Arts and Dickson (2004: 6) argue that the 
interests of Member States permeate the Commission. This entails that the commissioners 
must find a balance between the impartiality they are supposed to display, common EU 
interests, and national allegiances. Hence, sections of the Commission might have competing 
interests, despite the overall goal to eradicate poverty, especially in the South (Arts and 
Dickson 2004: 7). Still, the Commission has the possibility to exercise great influence in 
development policy, as this area does not normally raise too much political sensitivity 
(Hoogne and Nugent 2006: 153).  
 
The administrative structure of the Commission is organised around Directorates-General 
(DG) (Hoogne and Nugent 2006: 149). The DGs are all responsible for different parts of the 
EC’s policies, and the number of DGs and services has changed throughout the last decades. 
The area of external relations is covered by four DGs: DG for Development, DG for External 
Relations, DG for Enlargement and DG for Humanitarian Assistance. The DG for 
Development is responsible for the relationship with the ACP countries, sets development 
policy and federates European development policy across the globe (European Commission 
2010c). The DG for External Relations is responsible for the Commissions relations with the 
outside world, including the European Neighbourhood policy. It further ensures that the 
programmes for specific countries are in accordance with the overall EU development goals. 
The DG for Enlargement is responsible for financial aid to potential and future EU Member 
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States, while the DG for Humanitarian Assistance provides emergency relief to victims of 
disaster and war outside Europe (European Commission 2010c). The bureaucrats in the 
different DGs work on instruction from their responsible commissioner and elaborate on the 
proposals made by the commissioners (Nes 2009: 13). In this way, the bureaucrats are also 
involved in the forming of politics. The fact that the DGs do not share common nationalities 
or party loyalties makes the establishment of common EU interests even more difficult (Arts 
and Dickson 2004: 6). 
 
5.2.2 Possibilities for influence 
The size of the Commission has increased as more countries have joined the EU, and the 
internal composition and responsibilities have changed. The Commission was initially made 
up of two commissioners of each of the Member States with the largest populations and one 
commissioner from each of the other Member States. Since the Treaty of Nice, this was 
changed to one commissioner from each Member State. Thus, there are now 27 
commissioners. A larger Commission would naturally entail smaller possibilities of single 
Member States influencing the decision-making process, as there is a greater diversion of 
interests. However, groups of like-minded Member States could still get together and 
coordinate their priorities in order to try to promote their interests in the Commission. A 
strong argument for following a common coordinated policy is its importance for the EU in 
order to exercise greater influence in international affairs (Arts and Dickson 2004: 6). The fact 
that the DGs are responsible for different parts of the EC’s external actions could also entail 
that the actual outcome is due to bureaucratic processes, not influence of individual Member 
States. The next chapter analyses how Member States and common European interests have 
influenced the aid allocation. 
 
5.3 DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The European Union has through several forums, both within the EU and within the 
international community, stated their goals for reducing poverty, increasing and improving 
their aid, and making aid more efficient. The internal goals of the EU are stated in the articles 
130u-130y in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht treaty) and the European Consensus 
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on Development 24 . Internationally, the EC makes great efforts to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) of the UN from 2000. 
 
5.3.1 Development policy from the Rome Treaty to the Lisbon treaty 
Development policy in the EU has changed and evolved since its initiation, while influenced 
by the EU’s own internal metamorphosis (Siraj 2009: 1). This can be seen in the description 
of how changes like the signing of new treaties and expansions of the EU lead to changes in 
the development policy. Table 5.1 displays the forums which lay the basis for the goals and 
objectives of the EU development policy. 
 
Table 5.1: Objectives of treaties and agreements 
 Poverty oriented 
goals and objectives 
Focus on recipient 
merits 
Areas of focus 
Treaties 
Treaty of Rome, 1957 Promote economic and 
social development, 
establish close 
economic relations. 
None. ‘Overseas Countries 
and Territories’. 
Treaty on European 
Union, (Maastricht 
Treaty) 1992 
Sustainable economic 
and social 
development, 
campaign against 
poverty, integrating 
developing countries 
into the world 
economy, comply with 
EU approved UN 
objectives. 
Promote democracy, 
human rights and the 
rule of law. 
Enhancing the 
development among 
the developing 
countries, particularly 
the most disadvantaged 
of them. 
The Lisbon treaty, 
2009 
Poverty reduction and 
poverty eradication, 
comply with EU 
approved UN 
objectives. 
Promote democracy, 
human rights and the 
rule of law. 
Developing countries 
as well as assisting 
third countries other 
than developing 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 The European Consensus on Development is valid for the EU as a whole, that being both the Member States 
and the European Commission. 
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Table 5.1 continued 
Agreements 
The European 
Consensus on 
Development, 2005 
Poverty eradication, 
sustainable 
development, work to 
achieve the MDG’s. 
Promote the values of 
respect for human 
rights, fundamental 
freedoms, peace, 
democracy, good 
governance, gender 
equality, the rule of 
law, solidarity and 
justice. 
Developing countries, 
including both low 
income countries and 
middle income 
countries. Focus on the 
least developed and 
other low income 
countries. 
Millennium 
Development Goals, 
2000  
(United Nations 
Millennium 
Declaration) 
Increase aid to 0.7% of 
GNI by 2015. 
Eight goals including 
fighting poverty, 
achieving universal 
education, improving 
health, promoting 
gender equality, 
economic 
sustainability and 
global cooperation. 
Good governance, 
strengthen respect for 
human rights, 
democracy. 
Least developed 
countries, Small island 
developing states, 
landlocked developing 
countries, heavily 
indebted countries, 
Africa and fragile 
states. 
 
 
The development policy of the EU has existed since the Treaty of Rome was established in 
1957. In Part IV, “Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories”, Articles 131-36, it 
is stated that the European Community shall promote “economic and social development of 
the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations with them and the 
Community as a whole” (European Community 1957)25. These countries and territories are 
limited to those who “have special relations with Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom” (European Community 1957). The European 
Development Fund (EDF) was created to financially assist these regions (Van Reisen 2002: 
12). The beginning of the development policy was thus limited in scale, with only some 
twenty countries and territories included. The Treaty of Rome also had a strong focus on trade 
relationships, by abolishing customs duties on imports between the countries and territories 
and all Member States. However, as shown in the previous chapter, the group of associated 
countries, and thus the number of countries embraced by the European Community’s 
development policy, expanded throughout the 1970s and 80s. 
 
                                                 
25
 The full length of articles 131-33 of the Rome Treaty are added in the appendix. 
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With the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a legal basis for the EU development policy was created, 
and the development cooperation was through the Maastricht Treaty fully integrated into the 
EUs acquis communautaire26 (Van Reisen, 2007: 47). The objectives for development in the 
Maastricht treaty were to promote sustainable economic and social development, the 
campaign against poverty and the harmonious integration of the developing countries into the 
world economy (Van Reisen 2007: 47; European Union 1992: art. 130u; Olsen 2005: 573)27. 
Hence, the union also took on a more global development approach trough the Maastricht 
Treaty. Still, article 130w safeguarded the special ACP-EU relationship (European Union 
1992). The Maastricht Treaty also stated that the development aid of the Community was 
supposed to work together with the bilateral development policies of the Member States 
(Olsen 2005: 573; European Union 1992). This is also known as the principles of 
coordination and complimentarity, where the first aims for the EC and the Member States to 
coordinate their activities, and the latter stated that the programmes of the EC should be in 
addition to the programmes of the Member States (Van Reisen 2002: 13). The Maastricht 
Treaty also set a focus on enhancing the development among the most disadvantaged of the 
developing countries. The cooperation with other donor organisations was also emphasised, 
by stating that “The Community and the Member States shall comply with the commitments 
and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations 
and other competent international organizations” (European Union 1992: art. 130u, 3). 
Through this article, the EC commits itself to the MDGs, which will be elaborated later on in 
the chapter. Through the Maastricht Treaty, the EC also stated that the development policy 
shall contribute to the objective of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(European Union 1992: art. 130u, 2). The EU thus committed to allocating aid based on 
recipient needs and recipient merits. The development policy was consolidated in Amsterdam 
Treaty of 1999, art. 177-181, while the Treaty of Nice of 2001 added a new title, XXI, with a 
new article 181a. The new title in the Treaty of Nice was added in order to ensure a legal 
basis for aid to the former countries of the Warsaw Pact (Van Reisen 2007: 48). 
 
The objectives of the development policy of the EU have again been revised in the Lisbon 
treaty, which entered into force on the 1st of December 2009. The changes are not significant, 
and the emphasis on poverty elimination is continued, as Article 208 part 1 clearly states that 
                                                 
26
 The EU’s acquis communautaire is the legal provisions already negotiated in earlier EU treaties. The aquis 
communautaire is the body of EU laws and regulations. 
27
 Articles 130u-130y of the Maastricht Treaty are added in the appendix. 
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“(…) Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction 
and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty” (European Union 2007). Moreover, Article 
208 part 2 continues to emphasise the cooperation with the EU and the UN (European Union 
2007). The most notable change is the fact that Article 209 of the Lisbon treaty has not 
reproduced the sentence on the special status of the ACP-EU Convention, which was stated in 
the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
5.3.2 The European Consensus on Development 
The European Consensus on Development (ECD) was reached in 2005 when the 
representatives of the EU Member States in the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament 
met to decide on common goals for development policy. In the first part of this statement, the 
EU commits to “poverty eradication, ownership, partnership, delivering more and better aid 
and promoting coherence for development” (European Union 2006: 2). The statement also 
gives a description of what the EU perceives as poverty. According to the ECD, the core 
aspects of poverty include people of either gender who are deprived or perceived as 
incapacitated in different societies and contexts, in terms of economic, political, socio-cultural 
or protective capabilities. Moreover, poverty relates to limitations within areas such as 
consumption and food security, health, education, rights, the ability to be heard, human 
security especially for the poor, dignity and decent work (European Union 2006: 3). Cox et al. 
(2000: 27-28) argue that the EC uses a relative concept of poverty, with a wide concept of 
deprived people and those who are marginalised and discriminated against. This broad 
perception of poverty is displayed in the definition of poverty introduced in the ECD. The 
consensus also emphasises the importance of development policy, stating that it is “at the 
heart of the EU’s relations with all developing countries” (European Union 2006: 1). In the 
ECD the EU acknowledges that there is more than a moral obligation to aid, as it is an 
important measure in promoting peace and security, prosperity and stability.  
 
The EDC also states that the primary responsibility for development lies with the developing 
countries themselves, but that the developed countries also share this responsibility (European 
Union 2006: 1). The consensus continues the focus of the treaties on the thought that 
development cooperation is a shared competence between the Community and its Member 
States, and that the Community policies in this sphere are meant to complement the 
development policies of the Member States. The EU recognises its responsibility as a 
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substantial contributor of aid, and therefore states a focus on increasing the assistance, along 
with its effectiveness and quality (European Union 2006: 1).  
 
Furthermore, the EDC states that the least developed countries and other low income 
countries (LDC and OLICs) will be prioritised, in order to achieve more balanced global 
assistance (European Union 2006: 2). The agreement also emphasises delivering more and 
better aid as an important objective. Another important aspect of this objective is reducing 
transaction costs of aid in order to provide better aid, along with working with developing 
partner countries to use increased aid flows more effectively (European Union 2006: 5). The 
EU will also work for less volatile and more stable aid to development countries, so that the 
partner countries will receive predictable aid which will make planning easier (European 
Union 2006: 5).  
 
5.3.3 Millennium Development Goals 
The primary objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of 
sustainable development, including the pursuit of the millennium development goals (MDGs) 
(European Commission 2007: 10). 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are stated in the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration, an agreement reached by the Member States of the UN in 2000 28 . The 
declaration was signed by 189 countries (World Bank, 2009a). In this declaration, the UN 
Member States acknowledge their collective responsibility to create a more peaceful, 
prosperous and just world. The MDGs were a historic commitment to eradicate absolute 
poverty, which also included concrete and measurable targets in areas which would have an 
immediate impact on the lives of people living in poverty (Van Reisen 2002: 7). The MDGs 
set a time limit for obtaining the stated goals. This limit is set to be the year 2015. Eight main 
goals are the primary focus of this declaration: 1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2) 
achieve universal primary education, 3) promote gender equality and empower women, 4) 
reduce the mortality rate of children, 5) improve maternal health, 6) combat HIV/Aids, 
malaria and other diseases, 7) ensure environmental sustainability, and 8) develop global 
partnership for development (European Union 2006: 2). Though my analysis focuses on the 
EU as a multilateral organisation, not the bilateral governments who actually signed the 
                                                 
28
 The Millennium Development Goals are a result of resolution 55/2 adopted by the General Assembly of the 
UN in 2000. 
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agreement, the MDGs still can be seen as a goal for the EC, because the EU clearly states the 
MDGs as a goal for the entire union, which thus includes both the Member States and the 
Commission (European Union 2006). The EU’s support for the MDGs is also implicitly stated 
in the treaties, which state that the Union and the Member States shall apply with their UN 
commitments. Furthermore, the EU has also explicitly stated that it fully supports the MDGs, 
and the EU has committed to following up the MDGs (Neal 2007: 183; European Union 2006: 
2). According to Neal (2007: 183-84), the goals focus on people rather than infrastructure 
projects, and they require cooperation by the recipient states in forming feasible action plans. 
Furthermore, the EU expects that the recipients respect human rights, follow the rule of law, 
and abide by international rules governing trade and finance. In this way, the EU applies the 
success of its accession strategies for the ten new Member States, to its client states (Neal 
2007: 184).  
 
The EU’s work towards the MDGs includes some ambitious goals for the target date in 2015, 
drawn up by the Commission (European Union 2008). These include to: 1) set new 
intermediate targets for growth in official aid budgets by 2010 with a view to achieving the 
overall target of 0.7 % of gross national income (GNI) by 2015; 2) speed up reforms that will 
improve the quality of aid; 3) rethink the way that the EU influences the conditions for 
development; and 4) ensure that Africa is the number one beneficiary of these new 
approaches and seize new opportunities for partnership between the two continents (European 
Union 2008).  
 
5.4 DEFINITE GOALS OR INTANGIBLE AMBITIONS? 
The EU’s development policy has changed, evolved and grown to include much more of the 
world’s developing countries since its cautious start with limited span. The initial 
development policy displayed in the Treaty of Rome was clearly based on the European 
Community’s relations with its former colonies, and it was therefore a mode of preserving its 
strategic interests. The changes in the development policy throughout the 20th century have 
shown a greater focus on recipient needs. While the Treaty of Rome claims the promotion of 
“social and economic development” and establishing a close economic relationship with the 
overseas countries and territories, the Maastricht Treaty is more characterised by prioritising 
recipient needs. It focuses on “the campaign against poverty”, integrating development 
countries into the world economy, poverty eradication and encompassing all developing 
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countries (European Union 1992; European Community 1957). Hence, the eradication of 
poverty and promotion of sustainable development now prevail as the main goals of the EU. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty, the development policy has also included “good governance” 
criteria and a focus on the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms for aid 
recipients, and by so it has brought the attention to recipient merits.  
 
The goals and objectives of the EU development policy are ambitious in the sense that they 
seek to eradicate poverty, achieve sustainable development and integrate the developing 
countries into the world’s economy. Poverty eradication is not impossible; however, these 
goals are not easily achievable. Furthermore, it may be difficult to measure the performance 
of the EU towards its goals. As Van Reisen (2002: 6) argues, the challenge lies in turning 
long-standing commitments into measurable actions and results. Hence, a problem in 
assessing development policy and donor performance in accordance with their goals, are the 
vague and wide definitions of focus-areas. Van Reisen (2002: 21) states that the Commission 
is working on a methodology on how to measure the progress of the poverty focus of the 
Community development cooperation. There are however methodological challenges, as it is 
impossible to isolate the impact on poverty from one individual donor in a specific country, 
because the indicators may be influenced by many exogenous factors. There is also the 
problem of a time lag between input and expected results (Van Reisen 2002: 21). 
 
In one way, the goals of the EU will not be fulfilled until poverty is eradicated. In another 
sense, part of the development policy includes more concrete and measurable objectives, as 
concrete goals are set for increasing the amount of aid to 0.7 percent of GNI, prioritising 
Least Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, much of it has room for 
interpretation and arbitrary evaluations on how well the EC performs. The upcoming chapter 
will give us an indication on how the aid allocations of the EC can be explained by the 
theoretical dimensions, and whether the aid allocation of the EC is in actual correspondence 
with these goals. Furthermore, it will evaluate whether the goals have determined the aid 
allocation to a greater extent than the strategic interests displayed through history. 
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6. ANALYSING THE EC’S AID ALLOCATION 
This chapter presents the results from the analysis of the European Commission’s motives for 
aid allocation since the 1960s, and assesses whether the aid allocations have been in 
accordance with the stated goals, presented in chapter five. First, the data on EC’s aid 
allocation is presented for the different regional and income groups is presented for part I, the 
traditional developing countries, and part II, the more advanced developing countries, 
respectively. The analysis also takes a closer look at the African Caribbean and Pacific 
countries (ACP group), and EC aid to different sectors. The data on the EC’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) allocation is presented in terms of actual disbursements in 
percent of total aid to developing countries, and Official Aid (OA) in percent of total aid to 
part II countries. The empirical material is presented and discussed in relation to the 
dimensions that were elaborated in the method chapter, namely recipient needs, donor-interest, 
recipient merits and possibilities for influence. The historical background along with the 
stated goals and information on the composition of the EC can provide valuable information 
on why the EU allocates aid the way it does.  
 
Second, the findings are summarised, and the donor-behaviour of the EC is discussed. This 
will indicate whether its behaviour can be perceived as altruistic or self-oriented. Lastly, 
motives for EC aid allocation is analysed aid according to the goals and objectives presented 
in chapter five. This displays how well the actual aid allocations correspond with the stated 
goals and objectives.  
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6.1 EC AID ALLOCATION 
 
Figure 6.1: Total EC ODA allocations 
 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat, DAC 2a. 
Notes: This list includes only ODA, and hence leaves out OA. The numbers are ODA disbursements, presented 
in current US dollars. The part II list of recipients was abolished in 2005. The figure presents aid to all recipients, 
total, which includes both aid to developing countries and aid to multilateral part I recipients. 
 
Figure 6.1 shows a considerable increase in ODA from the EC from 1960 to 2008. The 
increase reflects how the number of developing countries embraced by the EU throughout the 
last six decades has grown, as well as the growing economy of the EU due to the inclusion of 
several new Member States in the same time period.  
 
Figure 6.1 provides indications on how the international trends presented in chapter four 
might have influenced the total aid disbursements of the EC. First, in the years of the two 
international economic crises, the aid flows do not seem to have decreased or stagnated as 
might have been expected. Actually, aid allocation increased with almost 500 million US 
dollars from 1970 to 1975, and the increase in ODA continued until 1980. Second, in the 
1990s, following the end of the Cold War, one might also have expected aid flows to stagnate 
or decrease due to the increased flows of OA to the European part II countries. However, the 
fall of the Berlin wall in 1990 was not followed by decreasing or stagnating aid flows either. 
In fact, total amounts of aid increased substantially from 1985 to 1990, and almost doubled 
from 1990 to 1995. Third, since the MDGs were established in 2000, and until 2008, the 
amount of ODA from the EC was almost tripled. In 2005, the part II list of recipients was 
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abolished. This entails that Official Aid was reported as ODA from 2005, which might partly 
explain this drastic increase in ODA. The next sections will elaborate more closely on how 
these resources have been allocated. 
 
6.1.1 Targeting recipient needs 
As discussed in section 5.3.2, poverty is a concept that is not easily defined. It may entail 
many aspects of a person’s, community’s or country’s life. Poverty may be defined both as 
absolute, which refers to people in lack of basic necessities for survival, or relative, which 
refers to people who live below the general standards of living in the society (European Anti-
Poverty Network 2010). The EU definition of poverty stated in the European Consensus on 
Development includes a wide aspect of what may be perceived as deprived people, and a wide 
range of policy areas that are considered to influence the level of poverty. This definition 
facilitates a wide understanding of what kind of poverty areas the EC intends to focus on. 
However, the overall goals of the EU, presented in chapter five, clearly state a focus on the 
most disadvantaged and least developed countries. These goals tend towards the definition of 
absolute poverty, while at the same time making sure that the countries with relative poverty 
are also included. The most precise way of measuring the EC poverty focus, is to analyse the 
amounts of aid that is allocated to the poorest countries and regions. Moreover, the definition 
in the European Consensus on Development emphasises access to health, food and education, 
focus areas which are also stated in the MDGs. Analysing whether these areas are also the 
focus of the EC aid allocation is done by evaluating which sectors are prioritised in the aid 
allocation. Combined, this will give insight as to whether the EC focuses on poverty when 
allocating aid.  
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Table 6.1: EC allocation to income-groupings 
Recipient/ 
Year 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
LDCs 87,75 % 55,88 % 50,59 % 55,45 % 54,43 % 41,81 % 
Other LICs 0,57 % 12,66 % 9,39 % 9,14 % 5,92 % 3,59 % 
LMCs 5,13 % 14,85 % 24,41 % 24,14 % 20,71 % 20,88 % 
UMICs 0,28 % 5,66 % 9,04 % 1,4 % 3,83 % 3,85 % 
MADCTs .. 0,15 % 2,76 % 1,9 % 1,79 % 0,6 % 
Part I, 
unallocated 
by income** 
6,27 % 10,8 % 3,81 % 7,97 % 13,32 % 29,27 % 
Developing 
countries, 
total 
3,51 110,31 179,88 677,32 1 043,42 1 319,98 
 
Recipient/ 
Year 
1990 1995 2000 2005* 2008 
LDCs 45,2 % 32,91 % 22,93 % 33,31 % 31,04 % 
Other LICs 11,62 % 7,4 % 3,11 % 6,57 % 5,23 % 
LMCs 24,3 % 25,88 % 32,42 % 26,68 % 25,93 % 
UMICs 4,29 % 8,82 % 21,81 % 11,65 % 19,91 % 
MADCTs 0,77 % 1,82 % 1,36 % 0,02 % .. 
Part I, 
unallocated 
by income** 
13,82 % 23,17 % 18,36 % 21,77 % 17,88 % 
Developing 
countries, 
total 
2 562,86 4 722,79 4 414,01 8 686,53 14 427,68 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat, DAC 2a. 
Notes: The numbers are ODA disbursements, presented as percent of total ODA to developing countries. The 
total amounts are presented in current US dollars. 
* The part II list of recipients was abolished in 2005.  
** “Unallocated by income” means that the funds cannot be placed into the DAC categories of Income Groups, 
because the recipient of the funds is unknown or undetermined at the time the aid agency is reporting aid flows. 
 
 
Table 6.1 shows the EC’s aid allocations according to income groupings. First of all, the focus 
on the least developed countries (LDCs) in the aid allocation of the EC until the 1980s is 
apparent. One observes that until 1985, the EC distributed the better part of its ODA, more 
than fifty percent, to the LDCs. Considering the fact that the focus areas of the Community’s 
development policy at this stage primarily were former colonies, this suggests that many of 
the associated countries were also among the poorest. From 1985, aid allocations to the LDCs 
declined, and reached is lowest point in 2000, with only approximately 23 percent of the total 
amount of ODA going to the LDCs. Simultaneously, the upper middle income countries 
(UMICs) experienced a sudden growth of ODA, from almost nine percent in 1995, to 
approximately 23 percent in 2000. Flows to the other low income countries (Other LICs) have 
remained relatively low throughout the time period. However, this is not too disturbing, since 
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there are fewer countries in this group29. The low middle income countries (LMCs) have 
experienced stable aid allocations from the 1970s until today, amounting to more than 20 
percent each year throughout this period. Van Reisen (2002) argues that this shift in aid 
allocations is due to the changes in nature of the thematic budget lines. Also, Table 6.1 shows 
that aid allocations to the more advanced countries and territories (MADCTs) have remained 
very low throughout the entire time period from 1960 to 2008. This corresponds with the fact 
that, at least from the 1990s, most MADCTs received OA and not ODA. 
 
This suggests that the EC has allocated substantial aid flows to the poorest countries, at least 
when counting LDCs, OLICs and LMCs. This weakens Berthélemy’s (2006: 107) argument 
that the EC is insensitive to recipient needs. Certainly, the focus on absolute poverty has been 
weakened, but still the relatively high allocations to LDCs until the 1990s show a 
considerable focus on poverty until the fall of the Berlin Wall. What is more, this shows that 
while the development policy was primarily focused on colonial ties, the poorest countries 
were also the main beneficiaries of development assistance. But, while the development 
policy increased its focus on poverty eradication, the aid allocations to the poorest countries 
decreased. This finding is interesting considering that the EU to a great extent has been 
labelled a strategic actor based on its association with the former colonies. 
 
As seen in Table 5.1 in the previous chapter, the EU development policy through the 
European Consensus on Development states a focus on all developing countries including 
LMCs and UMICs, while the Treaty on European Union states a focus on all developing 
countries, but particularly the most disadvantaged ones. In this regard, the actual allocation of 
the EU is in accordance with the aims of the development policy. 
 
However, it seems like the declining aid allocations to the LDCs are not solely a trend within 
the EC. Norberg (2000) argues that overall aid from the OECD countries to the LDCs has 
decreased from 38 per cent in the mid-1980s to 31 per cent in 1997. Thus, a variety of donors 
might have changed their priorities in the aftermath of the Cold War. Riddell (1999: 324) 
presents another explanation to this change; He argues that the increase of aid to the middle-
income countries could be due to the donors’ increased focus on allocating aid to the countries 
                                                 
29
 According to the OECD.Stat listing of 2010, there are 12 countries and territories in the Other LIC grouping, 
whereas 49 countries and territories in the LDC group, 48 countries and territories in the LMIC group, 43 
countries and territories in the UMIC group and 27 countries and territories in the MADCT group.  
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with the greatest market potential. Hence, disbursements have shifted from the poorest 
countries to the middle income countries, as the trade and investment potential is more likely 
to be greater in these countries. 
6.1.2 Changing regional priorities 
The poverty focus of the EU can also be assessed by analysing which regions are prioritised, 
as most of the world’s poorest countries are located in Africa, more specifically in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the MDGs state that Africa is a region which should be given 
priority. The development policy of the European Community has also given a greater focus 
to some regions more than others. The Treaty of Rome focused primarily on overseas 
countries and territories, which were primarily African countries30. However, Table 6.2 shows 
that the number of countries embraced by the development policy of the European 
Community and later the European Union has grown, in line with the changes made.  
 
Table 6.2: EC aid allocation to regional groupings  
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Europe  10,43 % 2,74 % 0,41 % 2,4 % 0,69 % 
North of 
Sahara 
 0,20 % 4,20 % 1,26 % 4,34 % 6,04 % 
South of 
Sahara 
89,74 % 86,47 % 72,53 % 54,98 % 60,13 % 53,62 % 
North and 
Central 
America 
 0,15 % 3,11 % 2,28 % 4,9 % 2,92 % 
South 
America 
 2,58 % 2,01 % 1,20 % 0,9 % 2,15 % 
Far East Asia 3,99 % 0,11 % 2,50 % 1,77 % 2,62 % 2,07 % 
South and 
Central Asia 
  5,30 % 29,23 % 13,35 % 7,55 % 
Middle East   2,64 % 3,34 % 2,01 % 1,18 % 
Oceania 0,57 %  1,16 % 0,18 % 1,41 % 1,13 % 
Developing 
countries, 
unspecified*** 
5,7 % 0,06 % 3,81 % 5,34 % 7,94 % 14,54 
Developing 
countries, total 
3,51 110,31 179,88 677,32 1 043,42 1 319,98 
                                                 
30
 These countries and territories were: Senegal, French Sudan, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, 
Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta; Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad and Gabon; Saint Pierre and Miquelon, 
the Comoro Archipelago, Madagascar and dependencies, French Somaliland, New Caledonia and dependencies, 
French Settlements in Oceania, Southern and Antarctic Territories; The Autonomous Republic of Togoland; The 
trust territories of the Cameroons under French administration; The Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi; The 
trust territory of Somaliland under Italian administration; Netherlands New Guinea (European Community 1957). 
 62 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005* 2008 
Europe -0,72 % ** 5,82 % 26,82 % 12,55 % 20,73 % 
North of 
Sahara 
4,78 % 6,26 % 7,4 % 8,3 % 7,87 % 
South of 
Sahara 
59,04 % 37,75 % 24,93 % 36,85 % 33,79 % 
North and 
Central 
America 
4,49 % 8,55 % 4,39 % 3,81 % 4,03 % 
South 
America 
4,97 % 4,16 % 2,98 % 3,33 % 3,13 % 
Far East Asia 3,78 % 4,34 % 4,56 % 3,67 % 3,1 % 
South and 
Central Asia 
6,11 % 8,6 % 6,74 % 9,46 % 8,62 % 
Middle East 2,1 % 4,63 % 5,07 % 5,94 % 7,12 % 
Oceania 2,43 % 1,68 % 1,21 % 0,98 % 0,65 % 
Developing 
countries, 
unspecified*** 
9,31 % 16,73 % 14,21 % 11,46 % 10,10 % 
Developing 
countries, total 
2 562,86 4 722,79 4 414,01 8 686,53 14 427,68 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat, DAC2a.  
Notes: This table shows only ODA, excluding OA. The numbers are ODA disbursements presented in percent of 
total aid to developing countries. The total ODA to developing countries is presented in current US dollars. The 
numbers do not add up to 100 % of EC aid to developing countries, as minor aid allocations to unspecified 
regional groups are excluded.  
*From 2005 the Part II list of ODA recipients was abolished. 
**Net disbursements will be negative for years where repayments on loans made by the recipient country 
exceeded ODA disbursements to that country. ODA = grants + loans – repayments of loans. In DAC statistics, 
loan payments are recorded as negative. 
*** “Developing countries unspecified” indicates that the aid went to developing countries, but that the exact 
recipients were unknown at the time of reporting. 
 
Table 6.2 shows that the EC aid allocation to Africa South of Sahara has been high, 
amounting to more than fifty percent of total aid to developing countries until 1995, when the 
amounts dropped dramatically to 37 percent of total ODA to developing countries. Since the 
agreement of the MDGs in 2000, a year that also was a low point for the EC-Sub Saharan 
Africa allocations, the allocations to Africa south of Sahara have increased somewhat, but it 
has not reached the heights of previous allocations. However, just like the downfall in ODA to 
the LDCs, the decrease of aid to African countries is not merely a European trend. ODA from 
the OECD countries to Sub-Saharan Africa actually fell from 31 percent in the mid-80s to 27 
percent in 1997 (Norberg 2000). These trends are also interconnected, as most LDCs are 
located in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The explanation to the decreasing allocations to Sub-Saharan Africa lies in the change of 
focus towards the EU neighbouring countries. This becomes clear in Table 6.2, which shows 
that from 2000, the European region experienced a significant increase in aid allocation. The 
ODA allocations to Europe were very low (except in 1965) until 2000, when it suddenly 
increased to almost 27 percent of total ODA to developing countries. This was even before 
the part II list of recipients was abolished, which means that until 2005, the aid presented in 
Table 6.2 was in addition to the OA flows to Europe this year. The situation in Europe in the 
1990s with the turmoil in the Balkans can to a certain extent explain the sudden rise of aid to 
Europe, considering that Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia were among the 
main recipients (OECD 2010d). Rebuilding Balkan was important for security in Europe, as 
these countries were torn by war and conflicts. Also, aid was allocated to these areas to help 
stabilise the situation because the instability in these countries also added a fear for increased 
immigration to the EU (Olsen 2005: 583). These countries were also poor, but more in terms 
of the relative concept of poverty31. Another country that received substantial amounts of aid 
form the EC during this time period was Turkey, receiving 15 percent of total aid to 
developing countries in 2000 (OECD 2010d)32. As shown in Table 6.2, the Middle Eastern 
countries also experienced an increase of aid allocations from 1995, continuing into the 2000s. 
Cox and Chapman (2000: 73) argue that the steep increase in aid to the Middle Eastern 
countries and Turkey was due to the special support these countries received after the Gulf 
War. However, Turkey was a special case to the EU, as it had long been an applicant for the 
European Economic Community. In 1999, the EU gave Turkey candidate status, which 
entailed that it received pre-accession financial assistance (European Commission 2010b). 
 
Olsen (2005: 576) argues that the end of the Cold War introduced new priorities that 
influenced the EU policy towards poor countries. These were characterised by two trends;  1) 
widening aims, from the original goal of promoting social development towards an increasing 
focus on the promotion of stability, security and democracy, and 2) a changing geographical 
focus, from its former emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa to higher priority of North Africa and 
Europe. It is evident that these trends are interconnected, as the main reason for the increase 
in aid to the neighbouring countries of the EU was to increase stability, promote democracy, 
and ensure security close to the EU borders. Hence, the strategic interests of the EU shifted 
                                                 
31
 These countries were listed as low middle income countries in 2000 by the DAC, except for Croatia, which 
was listed as upper middle income. Serbia was moved to the UMIC group in 2008. 
32
 Turkey was listed as an upper middle income country by the DAC in 2000. 
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from helping its former colonies, to a focus on the geo-political importance of its 
neighbouring countries. With this change of focus, the EU aid allocation also became less 
focused on helping the countries in absolute poverty. 
 
Aid from the EC to the developing world outside the ACP group has traditionally received 
little attention and political priority (Laffan 1997: 169). Table 6.2 shows that the aid 
allocations to South America were relatively low the entire time period from 1960 to 2008. 
Olsen argues that the Latin American countries were not included in the initiation of 
European Community development policy because of the lack of direct colonial ties to any of 
the Member States (Olsen 2005: 584). This is displayed in the very limited aid disbursements 
to the region until 1990. However, the accession treaty with Spain and Portugal in 1985 had a 
provision that aid to Latin America would be increased (Van Reisen 2007: 45). This can be 
seen from the increased aid to South America from 1985 to 1990. Still, this increase was not 
substantial, as it amounted to an increase of only two percent of total ODA to South America, 
and in fact decreased again after 1990. The Asian countries were not a priority to the 
European Community either, which is more puzzling considering the fact that this region had 
colonial ties with Europe (Olsen 2005: 584). In 1988, the European Parliament insisted on 
increased resources to aid programmes, and set up a separate co-operation scheme for Asia 
and Latin America, while at the same time stating that the cooperation should be strictly 
poverty-orientated (Van Reisen 2007: 45-46). However, as opposed to South America, actual 
aid disbursements to Asia did not seem to increase. In fact, aid to South and Central Asia 
decreased from almost 30 percent in 1975 to approximately 6 percent in 1990, whereas Far 
East Asian aid had a small increase from 1,77 percent in 1970 to 3,78 percent in 1990. Aid to 
all these regions have remained relatively stable or declined somewhat since 1995 and 
onwards. Van Reisen (2002: 16) emphasises that the allocations to Asia have been very low, 
especially considering that the largest amount of poor people live in Asia. 
 
The decreasing focus on the Asia and Latin American regions can be explained by a 
Commission statement in 2003, which expressed that development policy was no longer the 
basis for its activities in Asia and Latin America. The statement was followed by a decision to 
move these regions from the chapter on development to the chapter on external relations (Van 
Reisen 2007: 57). This is in line with Göran Hyden’s prediction: 
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Indeed, foreign aid is likely to cease being an important global activity because most countries in both 
Asia and Latin America will have developed to a level where other forms of capital and expertise will 
be more attractive (Hyden in Riddell 1999: 309).  
 
Based on the ODA allocations shown in Table 6.2, the focus areas of the EC seem to have 
moved towards the European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and away from the 
poorest countries. The EU has thus been forced to consider its interests as a regionally based 
organisation, at the expense of its altruistic donor goals. The change of focus also entails that 
the poverty-orientation has tended towards the more relative definition of poverty in the past 
two decades. The next section will provide insight into how the ACP countries have been 
affected by the changing regional priorities. 
 
6.1.3 EU relations with the ACP countries 
As shown in chapter four, the EU has had a special relationship with the African Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries since the initiation of its development policy, when the Treaty of 
Rome established an association with the former colonies. Van Reisen describes the origin 
and development of the ACP-EC cooperation by saying that “It can be shown that Europe’s 
relations with developing countries were built and expanded upon the basis of previous 
colonial connections” (2007: 31). Since then new treaties have been created and the objectives 
of the development policy have ceased to include only including associated countries. At the 
same time, the relationship with the ACP countries has expanded, and the group of associated 
countries has grown to include a majority of the world’s poorest developing countries. Is the 
EU’s relationship with these countries as preferential as its critics claim, and does it 
correspond with the goals of the EU? In order to examine this, one must take a look at what 
types of countries are actually included in this association.  
 
Table 6.3: Dispersion of ACP countries in income groups 
 LDC OLIC LMIC UMIC MADC
T 
Total of ODA eligible countries and 
territories* 
49 12 48 43 27 
ACP 40 6 11 21 1 
Source: Based on OECD distribution of countries and territories into different income groupings and list of ACP 
countries. 
Notes: This table is based on which income group the ACP countries belonged to in 2010.  
* Some of the ODA eligible countries and territories are overseas territories of European states.  
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Table 6.3 shows that of the 79 countries in the ACP group, 40 of them are least developed 
countries (LDCs) 33. This leaves only nine out of a total of 49 LDCs which are not in the ACP 
group. Six ACP-countries are other low income countries (OLIC), eleven ACP countries are 
low middle income countries (LMIC), 21 countries are upper middle income countries (UMIC) 
and only one country, Bahamas, is in the most advanced developing country and territories 
grouping (MADCT). This shows that a substantial amount of the ACP countries are also 
among the poorest, as approximately 58 percent of the countries are found in the low income 
groupings. Of these countries, the main beneficiaries were all in the low income groupings 
(OECD 2010d)34. 
 
Table 6.4: Dispersion of ACP-countries in regional groups 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
North and 
Central 
America 
South 
America 
Far East Asia Oceania 
Total of ODA  
eligible countries and 
territories* 
51 30 13 18 19 
ACP 48 14 2 1 14 
Source: Based on the OECD continent groupings, ODA eligible countries and territories (2010), and list of ACP 
countries. 
* Some of the ODA eligible countries and territories are overseas territories of European states.  
 
As for regions, Table 6.4 shows that 48 countries in the ACP groups are located in Sub-
Saharan Africa, while 14 are located in North and Central America, 14 are located in Oceania, 
two are located in South America, and one, East Timor, is located in Far East Asia. This 
shows a great focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, as there are only three ODA eligible territories in 
this region which is excluded from the ACP group35. Furthermore, Cox and Chapman (2000: 
51) notes that in the ACP group the Sub-Saharan countries have been the main beneficiaries 
of EC aid. 
 
The discussion about the preferential treatment of ACP countries has focused on the colonial 
status of the member states, which has overshadowed the actual income status of the group’s 
members. In reality, the ACP countries include many countries in the lower income groups, 
                                                 
33
 A table of which ACP countries belong to the different income groups or regions is added in the appendix.  
34
 Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Haiti. 
35
 The eligible territories are East African Community, Mayotte and St.Helena. Mayotte is French territory, while 
St.Helena is British territory. 
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although 22 countries in upper-middle income groups are also included. This suggests a more 
nuanced picture of the EU’s aid allocations to the ACP group being strictly strategic rather 
than poverty oriented. Also, the fact that countries of interest are also poor countries makes it 
difficult to assess whether it is the poverty or the interest in the ACP countries that create the 
motive for aid allocation to this group. It might be both. This is in line with Lumsdaine’s 
(1993: 73) argument that different motives, like development motives and colonial ties, 
sometimes work together, and should therefore be seen as complementary, instead of 
mutually excluding explanations. Furthermore, in the 1970s and early 1980s the cooperation 
under the Lomé agreement was admired as innovative and as an example for future 
regulations of the North-South relations, not only in Europe and the developing countries, but 
also within a broader international audience (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 
2003: 127; Hewitt and Whiteman 2004: 136). Thus, the relationship between the ACP 
countries and the European Union has also been perceived as a well-functioning cooperation, 
and not only as a tool for strategic politics from the EU’s part. 
 
Table 6.5: EC aid to the ACP-group 
Recipient/ 
year 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
ACP countries in 
percentage of total aid 
89,74 % 88,65 % 73,74 % 55,35 % 60,56 % 
ACP-countries  
Actual disbursements 
3,15 97,79 132,65 374,89 631,9 
Developing countries, total 3,51 110,31 179,88 677,32 1 043,42 
 
 
Recipient/ 
year 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005* 2008 
ACP countries in 
percentage of total aid 
49,79 % 64,59 % 41,73 % 23,88 % 35,37 % 33,51 % 
ACP-countries 
Actual disbursements 
657,29 1 655,4 1 970,61 1 054,24 3 072,61 4 834,56 
Developing countries, total 1 319,98 2 562,86 4 722,79 4 414,01 8 686,53 14 427,68 
Source: Based on OECD.Stats, DAC 2a. 
Notes: The numbers are ODA disbursements presented in current US dollars. 
*From 2005, the part II list of ODA recipients was abolished. 
 
 
Table 6.5 shows that the aid allocations to the ACP countries were very high in the 1960s. 
This is not surprising, as the Treaty of Rome stated an emphasis on the associated countries 
during these years. According to Smith (2004: 60), the ACP countries were at top of the 
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Community’s ‘pyramid of privileges’ during the Cold War, which is displayed in the high 
allocations to this group in the Cold War years. Schneider and Tobin (2009) argue that aid to 
the ACP countries decreased after the iron curtain fell, and new poor Member States were 
admitted to the EU. They argue that the focus shifted from the ACP countries to the new 
Member States in the EU, because they were more strategically important to the EU than the 
ACP group. Still, ODA allocations did not decrease substantially in the aftermath of fall of the 
Berlin wall. Table 6.5 shows that in 1990 the ODA to the ACP group remained quite high; 
amounting to approximately 65 percent of total aid to developing countries. These allocations 
did not decline substantially until 2000, when only about 24 percent of ODA was allocated to 
the ACP countries. As discussed in the previous section, the sudden drop of ODA allocation 
to the ACP group in 2000 must be seen in relations to the increased focus on Europe in the 
same time period. However, it was the Balkan countries and Turkey that were the main 
beneficiaries of these allocations, not the new Member States. These countries also received 
substantial amounts of aid, but as they were in the part II list of recipients, their allocations 
were listed as Official Aid, not ODA. As shown in section 6.1, the total aid allocations to 
developing countries did not decline due to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Hence, the allocations 
to the part II countries were not part of the reason for the change of priorities in ODA 
allocations. Considering that the ACP group includes most of the LDCs and Sub-Saharan 
countries, the relatively high ODA allocation to the ACP group until the 1990s can to a 
certain extent correspond with recipient needs.  
 
6.1.4 New priorities: EU and part II countries 
The allocations of Official Aid started in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when several 
states were made independent from the Soviet Union. Therefore, as noted in the theory 
chapter, including OA in the analysis is important, as EC indeed has spent substantial 
amounts on aid allocations in these regions, as Table 6.6 indicates. Apart from seeing how 
OA is spent, it is interesting to see whether the OA allocations have seemed to influence the 
size of the ODA allocations in this time period. Furthermore, the direction of OA can give us 
an understanding of what has motivated the EU to allocate aid to these regions, and whether 
these allocations can be seen as corresponding with the EU’s goals. 
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Table 6.6: EC aid to Part II countries 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
CEEC 100% 80,71% 62,67% 68,82% 70,46% 50,20% 66,02% 
NIC  19,29% 37,33% 31,18% 29,54% 44,58% 20,41% 
MADCT       -0,09% 
Total percent 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 94,78% 86,34% 
Part II, total 
disbursements 
397,46 1 560,96 818,98 707,69 1 234,57 1 216,26 1 434,48 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 
CEEC 66,57% 75,51% 78,56% 81,2% 81,55% 79,86% 78,84% 84,19% 
NIC 26,19% 19,73% 17,39% 14,85% 13,37% 19,28% 13,6% 10,04% 
MADCT 3,83% 2,15% 2,31% 1,98% 2,29% 0,82% 2,39% 2,47% 
Total percent 96,59% 97,39% 98,26% 98,03% 97,21% 99,96% 94,83% 96,7% 
Part II, total 
disbursements 
1 440,65 2 409,46 2 817,55 2 801,63 2 682,7 1 852,4 3 169 4 233,7 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat, DAC2a. 
Notes: The numbers are ODA disbursements, presented in current US dollars. The numbers do not add up to 
total part II aid, as minor budget lines are excluded. 
* 2004 is the last year with reported numbers for OA, as the part II list of OA recipients was abolished in 2005. 
Part II list countries are reported as receivers of ODA from 2005. 
** A list of which countries received aid from the EU within the different regions is added in the appendix.  
 
The data for part II countries were recorded from 1990. As seen in Table 6.6, the part II 
countries were mainly comprised by Central Eastern and European Countries (CEECs)36 and 
New Independent States (NIS) 37, with small amounts flowing to the MADCT38. Table 6.6 
shows that the CEECs have been the principle beneficiaries of Official Aid throughout the 
1990s until 2004. As noted by Cox and Chapman (2000: 11), the commencement of the Phare 
programme in 1990 marked the beginning of significant EC cooperation with the Eastern 
European region. The decision to allocate such substantial amounts to this region corresponds 
with the fact that, with the exception of Albania, all of the countries in the CEECs group were 
part of the new Member States included the EU in 2004 and 200739. The aid to the part II 
group has, with the exception of 2002, increased considerably since 1998. Cox and Chapman 
(2000: 101) further argue that the rapidly increasing amounts to the CEECs underline the 
responsiveness of the Phare programme to the increasing political and hence financial 
                                                 
36
 Central and Eastern European Countries which received OA during this period are Albania, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic.  
37
 New Independent States which received OA during this period are Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. 
38
 MADCT countries which received ODA in this time period have been transferred from the part I list. In 1996 
the following MADCT countries were transferred from the part I to the part II list: Bahamas, Brunei, the United 
Arab Emirates and Singapore. Form 1997 the following MADCT countries were transferred to the part II list: 
Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Falkland Islands, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong and Israel. In 2000, Aruba, Netherlands 
Antilles, Virgin Islands, Macao, French Polynesia and New Caledonia progressed to the part II list. From 2003, 
Malta and Slovenia progressed to the part II list (OECD 2009b). 
39
 Albania has applied for membership, but is not yet an official candidate country. 
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demands that were made in this period. This is in line with Smith’s (2004: 61) argument that 
politicisation of EU aid began after the Cold War with the CEECs, and is displayed through 
the strings attached to the Phare programme. Five criteria governed access to the programme: 
establishment of the rule of law, free elections, respect for human rights, political pluralism, 
and progress towards a free market (Laffan 1997: 152). While the CEECs received the brother 
part of the OA allocations, substantial amounts were also distributed to the NIS countries. 
This was due to the Tacis programme, a technical assistance programme for the former USSR 
countries, which began its operations in 1991 (Cox and Chapman 2000: 111). Although the 
end of the Cold War gave new incentives to emerging democracies, it also caused the former 
satellite states to erupt into conflicts and civil wars (Malmqvist 2000). The great 
disbursements to these two groups of countries show the geo-political importance of this 
region to the EU after the fall of the Berlin Wall in two respects; First, ensuring security and 
stability was important because of their geographical proximity to the EU, and second, 
substantial assistance was allocated in order to promote democracy and prepare these 
countries for accession to the EU. The Commission itself has justified these types of 
allocations, in stating that “By helping others, the EU helps to make life safer within its 
frontiers for its own citizens” (European Commission 2007: 3). However, these allocations 
have also been subject to criticism considering what the main motive behind EU aid is. 
Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003: 125) argue that the high aid allocations to 
CEECs and NIS indicates that poverty alleviation is not the overriding EU objective. 
 
These countries were all fairly new aid recipients, which entered the competition for funding 
against the more traditional recipients in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the latter type which 
had and still have, acute need for aid (Schraeder et al. 1998: 294). Cox et al. (2000: 26) argue 
that the decision to allocate increasing resources to part II countries during the 1990s often 
occurred at the cost of falling shares of total aid budget for the poorest countries. All though 
Table 6.2 showed decreasing flows to the poorest regions, total disbursements of ODA to the 
developing countries continued to rise40. However, with the abolition of the part II list of aid 
recipients, the total ODA disbursements were almost tripled from 2000 to 2008. It is therefore 
difficult to blame the allocations to these groups for the decreased assistance to the poorest 
regions. In this respect, it does not seem like the OA to part II countries “covers up the 
                                                 
40
 Note that this thesis considers the aid disbursements, that is, the actual allocations of aid, and not the 
budgetary commitments. The difference between commitments and disbursements can be substantial.  
 71 
picture” of how the ODA disbursements have changed. The sectoral allocations of the EC 
might tell us more about the poverty focus of the EU.  
 
6.1.5 Which sectors are prioritised? 
 
The EU’s development cooperation aims to give disadvantaged people in the third world control over 
their own development. This means attacking the sources of their vulnerability, including poor access to 
food and clean water, or to health, education and jobs and a sound environment (European Commission 
2007: 10). 
 
This statement in a Commission report displays the EU emphasis on improving certain sectors 
within the developing countries. McGillivray argues that while it is widely acknowledged that 
aid may reduce poverty through its impact on economic growth, “it must also be recognized 
that aid can reduce poverty through other channels” (McGillivray, 2003 in Thiele et al. 2007: 
2). Spending aid in the pro-poor fields of basic education and basic health are often noted in 
this context (Thiele et al. 2007: 2). Since year 2000, the EU has through the MDGs committed 
itself to give a special focus on eradicating poverty through the promotion of health, education 
and environment. Furthermore, Thiele, Nunnenkamp and Dreher (2007: 4) argue that most 
donors’ sectoral aid composition appears to be in line with a multi-dimensional objective 
function rather than one that narrowly focuses on economic growth. This also seems to be the 
case with the EC, as aid allocations are widely spread across different sectors. Hence, 
analysing the aid allocation to different sectors might further reveal whether the EU prioritises 
the sectors they claim to focus on. It will also indicate whether the EU from the year 2000 has 
considered the MDGs to a notable extent when prioritising aid to different sectors.  
 
When analysing the sectoral allocations, one must note that ODA can be given in various 
forms, which can be directed at projects with different goals of accomplishment. An important 
distinction is the difference between humanitarian and development aid. Humanitarian aid is 
applied to areas of crisis or emergency such as war, famine or natural disasters, and aims to 
save lives and ensure human dignity, by ensuring that people have food, water and medicine. 
Development aid however, seeks to alleviate and hinder the underlying socioeconomic 
problems that may cause crisis or emergency, as well as improve the general economic, social 
and political climate of the developing country (Norberg 2000). This can be done through 
building infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, schools and the like. Thus, one may say that 
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humanitarian aid seeks to solve short term problems, whilst the goal of development aid is to 
help build a society that is more self-supporting in the long term. While the objectives noted 
in the development policy will be labelled as development aid, humanitarian aid is also a 
necessary and important part of the aid allocation. Both are recorded as ODA.  
 
Some of the posts which are recorded as ODA are said to not be directly beneficial in terms of 
reducing poverty in the recipient developing countries. These posts are administrative costs, 
refugees in donor countries and debt forgiveness. Criticism has been given, especially from 
international NGOs, to the EU for including these costs in the total ODA and hence 
“inflating” the EC’s performance as a donor (Kovach and Wilks 2006). Kovach and Wilks 
(2006) argues that one third of EU aid in 2005 did not provide any new resources for 
developing countries, because these amounts instead were spent on debt cancellations and for 
refugees and students in donor countries. They also argue that debt cancellations will do little 
to fight poverty, and that these measures therefore cannot rightfully be called development 
assistance, because they do not provide new resources for developing countries (Kovach and 
Wilks 2006). However, it is unarguable that providing ODA for sectors such as social and 
economic infrastructure and services, production sectors and commodity aid, can be said to be 
directed against the goals of providing sustainable, social and economic development.   
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Table 6.7: EC aid according to sectors41 
 
1985 1995 2000 2005 2008 
I. Social infrastructure & services 12,89% 26,49% 25,29% 40,23% 27,29% 
I.1 Education* 5,48% 2,03% 5,42% 6,56% 4,42% 
I.2 Health* 0,79% 3,57% 4,08% 5,41% 2,06% 
II. Economic infrastructure and services 18,98% 16,84% 16,21% 17,09% 24,12% 
III. Production sectors 37,18% 17,29% 8,60% 6,24% 6,32% 
IV. Multisector/ Cross-cutting  6,93% 8,7% 5,48% 9,59% 
IV.1 General environment protection  1,34% 1,9% 2,34% 2,23% 
V. TOTAL SECTOR ALLOCABLE 
(I+II+III+IV) 
69,05% 67,55% 58,8% 69,03% 67,33% 
VI. Commodity aid/General program assistance 14,68% 28,46% 20,68% 13,95% 18,69% 
VI.2 Food aid 14,68%  5,94% 3,95% 1,94% 
VII. Action relating to debt     0,49% 
VIII. Humanitarian aid 0,93% 3,94% 12,49% 11,15% 7,79% 
IX. Administrative costs of donors 3,15%  2,55% 5,42% 5,18% 
X. Support to NGO’s  0,003% 1,32% 0,01%  
XI. Refugees in donor countries      
XII. Unallocated /unspecified 12,18% 0,07% 4,15% 0,44% 0,53% 
TOTAL (V+VI+VII+VIII+IX+X+XI+XII) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Based on OECD.Stat, ODA by sector. 
Notes: From 1988-1994 and from 1996 to 1999 data on sectoral aid allocation is unavailable. Humanitarian aid 
in DAC by sector and DAC 2a do not correspond. This table is based on DAC by sector. 
*Education and health are sub-categories to Social infrastructure and services. Food aid is a sub-category to 
Commodity aid, and General environment protection is a subcategory to Multisector/Cross-cutting. The reported 
numbers on these sectors are also included in the main category. 
 
By looking at allocations before and after the agreement in 2000, one can assess whether the 
priorities have changed due to the MDGs, and whether the EC allocations correspond with the 
MDGs.  The first MDG presents a wide target, of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. In 
the OECD ODA by sector, food aid is part of Commodity aid. Table 6.7 shows that the 
percentage of aid allocated as food aid has decreased substantially since 1985, from more than 
14 percent in 1985 to just under two percent in 2008. Health and education are sectors which 
are explicitly mentioned in the MDGs, and which are also possible to evaluate according to 
sectoral aid allocation. Furthermore, as noted above, these sectors should be assessed as areas 
                                                 
41
 As seen in table 6.7, the numbers for sectoral allocation are incomplete, as reported numbers for several years 
are lacking. Therefore, the table has been reduced to comprising of five years from 1985 until 2008. Reported 
numbers for the years around 1990 are non-existent. 
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which contribute to reducing poverty. Targets two and three sets out to achieve universal 
primary education and reduce gender disparities in education, while targets four, five and six 
seek to promote health issues, such as reducing child mortality and improve maternal health, 
as well as to combat HIV and AIDS (World Bank 2004). The Commission also emphasises 
that the its aid should support economic reforms, health and education, infrastructure 
programmes and in some cases cooperation in areas like research and development and 
environmental policy (European Commission 2007: 4). However, Table 6.7 shows that the EC 
allocations to these sectors are limited, as education has received around five percent of total 
ODA to developing countries each reported year, while aid to health sectors has been even 
lower, with the highest allocation amounting to around five percent in 2005. Hence, the 
commitment to the MDGs in 2000 does not seem to have influence the EC aid allocation to 
these sectors.  
 
The seventh goal of the MDGs focuses on environmental stability. The focus on environment 
is important as climate change causes natural disasters, such as draught, floods and storms, 
which again may cause disease and lack of food and water. Climate change will affect all 
people, but it will affect the poorest people in poor countries the most. Hence, the fight 
against poverty and climate change must be unified (Solheim 2010). However, Table 6.7 
shows that the EC allocations to general environment protection have been very limited.  
  
Cox and Chapman (2000: 126) argue that due to the high EC contributions to programme aid, 
food aid and humanitarian aid, allocations to other sectors tend to be lower than the OECD 
average. However, Table 6.7 shows that, on average, sector allocable aid constitute the 
majority of EC aid. Aid to these sectors is distributed to primary, secondary and tertiary 
industries, government and civil society, water and sanitation, along with health and education. 
These are all sectors which can directly help reduce poverty in the recipient country. Hence, 
the criticism from NGOs that the ODA levels were “inflated” based on alleged high 
allocations to debt-cancellation, administrative costs and aid to refugees in donor countries 
seems to be unreasonable, as the reported numbers to these sectors are insignificant. As noted, 
most aid is sector allocable aid, commodity aid and humanitarian assistance, which all aim at 
reducing poverty.  
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6.1.6 What about recipient merits? 
 
Not only is Europe the leading international aid donor, but it is uniquely driven 
not just by economic goals but by a philosophy based on the democratic and 
human values that are the bedrock of the European identity (Lambert 1997: 2). 
 
The EU’s policies on allocating aid to countries with good governance, respect for human 
rights, the rule of law and democracy, is closely linked to its policies on using conditionality 
in order to making the recipient countries comply with these goals. According to Smith (2005: 
23), conditionality is “the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived 
benefits to another state (such as trade or aid concessions) to the fulfilment of economic 
and/or political conditions”. Conditionality can be positive or negative in kind, where the first 
entails promising benefits to a state that fulfils a set of conditions, whereas the latter involves 
reducing, suspending or terminating such benefits if the conditions are violated. Smith (2005) 
argues that the EU’s use of positive conditionality has increased.  
 
Connecting aid with conditionality began after the end of the Cold War, with the new 
programmes for aid to the CEECs and NIS. As noted earlier, the OA allocations to the CEECs 
and NIS through the Phare and Tacis programmes were partly intended to promote democratic 
values such as human rights, rule of law, free elections, political pluralism, as well as progress 
towards a free economy42. With the CEECs, the EU had a carrot for making the recipient 
countries comply with the criteria; EU membership. This made it easier to monitor and 
withhold assistance if the recipient countries did not comply with EU demands. According to 
Laffan (1997: 169), the EU Member States recognised the view that the EU could not impose 
strict conditions on the former communist states without transferring these criteria to the other 
developing countries. Thus, a human rights clause was transferred to the ACP countries with 
the fourth Lomé Convention, and from 1995 the EU threatened to suspend cooperation with  
countries who violated human rights (Neumayer 2003: 11). In the 1990s, the EU more and 
more often resorted to the use of sanctions against developing countries that had disrespected 
human rights, democracy and governance norms (Arts and Dickson 2004: 10). There are some 
examples of how conditionality has been used: In 1994, the EU suspended negotiations on 
                                                 
42
 The OA allocations to the CEECs and NIS also consisted of aid financed outside of the Phare and Tacis 
programmes, such as humanitarian assistance managed by the European Community Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO) and food aid managed by European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). However, 
the vast majority of allocations to these countries have been made through the Phare and Tacis programmes (Cox 
and Chapman 2000: 106, 111). 
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financial transfers with ten ACP countries due to the deteriorating political situation in those 
counties (Laffan 1997: 168). Furthermore, in November 1995, the Commission suspended 
ECU 225 million in aid allocations to Nigeria under the Lomé Convention after the execution 
of nine human rights activists including the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian military 
regime (Laffan 1997: 169)43. 
 
Previous research has shown that the EC does not consider recipient needs when allocating 
aid (Berthélemy 2006). The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM 
2002) has acknowledged the difficulties of following up the “good governance’’ criteria. 
Although the goals are quite clear, the challenges lie with the fact that effective 
implementation is complicated. The ECDPM list several problems the donors face in 
implementing these policies: lack of detailed knowledge about the political setting, lack of 
insight into complex processes of political and societal changes and lack of effective 
coordination mechanisms, to mention a few (ECDPM 2002). There is also another problem in 
implementing ‘good governance’ criteria. As opposed to human rights and democracy which 
are protected by international law norms, good governance lacks legal definition, and is 
perhaps not a legal definition at all. This has lead to the EU acting against ‘bad governance’ 
and hence violated relative international law (Arts and Dickson 2004: 10). The EU has 
therefore tried to legalise its actions by incorporating detailed good governance criteria in its 
cooperation agreements. This has been done in the Cotonou agreement of 2000, but still the 
enforcement mechanism for good governance is applicable only for cases of serious 
corruption (Arts and Dickson 2004: 10). These issues show that, although the goals are quite 
explicit, there are several challenges involved in implementing good governance criteria. 
 
More recently, in 2007, the EU created a development programme called European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, which covers all third countries 44 . The 
programme promotes and supports human rights through civil society projects and through 
supporting regional and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN high 
Commissioner for Human Rights (European Commission 2010d). Yet, the budget line is quite 
limited, with 1.1 billion euro for 2007-2011 (European Commission 2009b).  
                                                 
43
 ECU is European Currency Unit, a former European currency unit which was the predecessor to the euro. It 
consisted of a currency scale of all the Member States currencies.   
44
 Third countries are all countries the EU has exter
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6.2 WHO HAS INFLUENCED AID ALLOCATION? 
The sections above have shown that there have been great changes in terms of which regions 
that have been prioritised. The analysis also shows that since the 1990s, the EC’s aid 
allocation has been more focused on its neighbouring states. Hence, the focus has moved 
towards a more relative definition of poverty, whereas the goals and objectives have 
increasingly been oriented towards the poorest countries and regions. This opens for the 
question: Who has been responsible for the directions of the aid allocations? Assessing 
whether the EU Member States or mutual EU interests have influenced the aid allocation is 
important and necessary both in terms of assessing whether the EC is an independent actor, 
and in order to understand how the EC acts as a multilateral donor. According to the 
theoretical postulations, the independence of the EC also entails that it should follow the 
stated goals for development policy, and that strategic interests should have no or little 
magnitude in the actual aid allocations of the EC. As previously discussed, this hardly seems 
to be the case.  
 
The initiation of the development policy of the European Community and the establishment of 
relations with the former colonies, was obviously the result of the former colonial powers, 
mainly Belgium and France at the time (Neal 2007: 179; Bretherton and Vogler in Van Reisen 
2007: 30). Germany and the Netherlands were actually strongly opposed to the initial 
proposals for “association” (Van Reisen 2007: 31). However, the Member States agreed to 
share part of the financial cost of assisting their former colonies, especially in Africa, as this 
secured their independence (European Commission 2007: 4). The finding by Berthélemy that 
EC aid is influenced by British commercial powers can be seen in relation to the expansion of 
the ACP cooperation, which with the accession of the UK in 1973 to the European Economic 
Community expanded to include the Commonwealth. The development assistance then grew 
to include partners in the Anglophone Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (Arts 2004: 102). 
Furthermore, as noted in chapter four, the inclusion of Spain and Portugal expanded the 
development policy to also include Latin America. However, as shown in Table 6.2, the 
allocations to these regions remained limited. Moreover, the formation of the EU’s 
progressive aid goals and comprehensive aid instrumentation were heavily influenced by 
Denmark and the Netherlands (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003: 128; 
Hewitt and Whiteman 2004). Siraj (2009: 8) notes that a development cooperation that 
originates from a colonial dependency is in contrast with multilateral donors, while similar to 
many bilateral donors. The scope of developing countries embraced by the EU development 
 78 
policy seems to have been influenced by the important focus areas of the different new 
Member States. This is displayed by the fact that every enlargement in the EU has increased 
the scope for development cooperation, both in terms of regional coverage as well as the kind 
of approaches adopted (Van Reisen 2007: 59). Member States have often pushed for EU 
action in their specific areas of interest, because it supplements their own activities, and 
because they together can make a greater global impact than what is possible for one country 
alone (Smith 2004: 64). 
 
There have also been changes in the priorities of the EU, which to a greater extent reflect the 
interests of the EU as a whole, rather than that of individual Member States. This especially is 
the case for the changes made in the prioritised areas for aid allocation after the end of the 
Cold War. ‘Politics of scale’ are often recognised as European interests, which are similar to 
Schneider and Tobin’s theory on aggregate of member state interests.  Smith (2004: 65)  notes 
that some types of interests can promote collective action by the EU. These are: sense of EU 
responsibility, security, countering US hegemony, promoting human rights and democracy. 
The action towards former colonies and the Eastern European countries has been labelled as 
originating from a sense of EU responsibility. Outbreaks of conflicts and wars have often 
triggered the security aspect of collective EU action. This has especially been evident when 
the countries in conflict are found in geographical proximity to the EU. As argued in section 
6.1.4, security aspects were important to the EU action towards its neighbouring countries, 
and the conflicts in the Balkans and the aftermath of the Gulf War are examples of conflicts 
that caused a rise in aid allocations to these regions. Chapter five showed how the promotion 
of human rights and democracy has become an important aspect of EU external actions, 
expressed in the Maastricht treaty in 1992, and manifested in the EU’s relations with the 
Eastern European countries. However, these interests have also worked together and enforced 
the common EU interests, especially towards the Eastern European countries, as aid 
allocations to these countries were influenced both by security aspects, a sense of EU 
responsibility, and promoting democracy.   
 
As the Commission is charged with upholding the interests of the Union as a whole, it is 
likely that it will prioritise common EU interests over the goals in the development policy 
when this is necessary for the security of the Union. Another way of promoting common 
Member State interests is through coordinating priorities, in order to have a better chance of 
having their voices heard and proposals adopted. Arts (2004: 104) argues that the 
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development ministers of ‘like-minded’ countries often consult each other before important 
meetings in the Council of Ministers, the EDF committee and other important bodies in order 
to  better promote their common interests.    
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the implementation of the development policy and the 
actual allocations has been controlled by EU bureaucrats in the European institutions, 
primarily in the Commission. This is evident through the composition of the Commission in 
chapter five, which has been subject to many technical inter-institutional changes within the 
Commission, with regard to the responsibilities for development policy (Van Reisen 2007: 
56). Olsen (2005: 580-581) argues that policy-making on development assistance is to a large 
extent restricted to elite actors based in the national aid bureaucracies as well as in the 
Directorate General for development. However, as displayed in this section, it seems like the 
outcome of development policy has reflected common EU interests, at least since the 1990s. 
 
6.3 SUMMARISING THE FINDINGS  
The analysis has shown that the strategic interests of the EC, especially expressed by 
historical ties and geo-political issues such as security and geographical proximity, have 
influenced the EC aid allocation. However, through the development policy of the EU, the EC 
strives to meet recipient needs by reducing poverty. Just like the development policy has 
changed, so has the actual allocations. This section will first summarise the findings, and then 
evaluate how well the EC aid allocation corresponds with the EU’s development goals. The 
main findings; the focus of the EC aid allocations according to the theoretical dimensions and 
the EU development policy are summarised in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8: Summary of findings 
Theoretical dimensions: Development policy: Actual allocations: 
Recipient needs Focus on the poorest countries 
and regions in the Maastrict 
Treaty, the European Consensus 
on Development, the MDGs and 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
Focus until the 1990s. 
Strategic interests Focus on associated countries 
and territories in the Treaty of 
Rome. 
Focus on previous colonies 
from 1960. This cooperation has 
been expanded until 2000. 
Focus on neighbouring 
countries from 1990. 
Recipient merits Focus on good governance, 
human rights and democracy in 
the Maastrict Treaty, the 
European Consensus on 
Development, the MDGs and 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
Implemented since the 1990s, 
still challenges to implement 
recipient merits criteria. 
Possibilities for influence The EC should be independent 
of its Member States and uphold 
the Unions interests. 
Influence by Member States in 
the expansion of countries 
covered by EC aid allocations 
until 1990s. Common EU 
interests have influenced EC 
allocations since 1990s.  
 
6.3.1 The EC: Altruistic or egoistic? 
 
The EU acts out of enlightened self-interest just as much as global solidarity 
(European Commission 2007: 2). 
 
This statement in a European Commission report on development policy shows the EU’s 
perception of itself as a global development actor. It is obvious, both in the development 
policy of the European Community and when looking at the disbursements of ODA, that the 
colonial ties of the EU Member States set the premise for the EC’s aid allocations in its 
inception. In this era, the development policy was primarily influenced by the interests of 
single Member States. The initiation of the cooperation was limited, as it only included some 
20 overseas countries and territories. This is also in line with the assumption that the 
decolonisation process was one of the main trends of international aid at the time. Although 
colonial ties were the motivation behind the EC’s aid allocation in the early era, the recipient 
countries were also among the poorest countries of the world, as indicated by the high rate of 
ODA to the LDCs until the mid-1980s. The analysis shows that the EC has indeed given the 
better part of ODA to low income countries and the Sub-Saharan region, at least until the 
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1990s. Another interesting observation is the composition of the ACP group. The bias in 
favour of this group has, as seen in chapter four, been explained by the EC’s colonial ties to 
these countries. This has also been part of the argumentation for the EC being an actor that 
bases its allocations on strategic interests. But there is another side to the coin: many of the 
countries in the ACP group are both low income countries, as well as located in the poorest 
regions. The allocation of aid to this group has therefore been in line with the EC’s 
development policies, not just the outcome of strategic considerations. Thus, to say that the 
EC is insensitive to recipient needs when allocating aid, simply based on the high 
disbursements to the ACP countries, would be a self-contradiction. This can also be explained 
by White’s argument that “differing motives will give rise to similar actions” (White 1974: 34 
in Siraj 2009: 3), indicating that aid given on the basis of strategic motives also can benefit 
the poor in the same way as aid given by altruistic motives.  
 
With the enlargements of the European Community to include several new Member States 
throughout the 20th century, the scope of developing countries embraced by the EC also grew 
substantially, while the development policy changed its focus to poverty eradication and 
including all developing countries. The expansion of development aid to several new 
associated countries and non-associated countries in Latin America and Asia entailed that the 
power of the EU as a global development player was enhanced, while it increased the 
perception the EU as an altruistic and benevolent actor. Still, despite the expansion of 
development policy to include new countries, the allocations to the new geographical areas in 
Latin America and Asia remained limited.  
 
While the increased number of countries embraced by the European Community’s 
development policy until 1990 primarily was influenced by the interest areas of certain 
Member States, the end of the Cold War lead to revived common European interests. This 
coincides with the fall of the Berlin Wall as a second trend that is claimed to have influenced 
the world’s donor community. In the case of the EU, it turned the EC aid away from the 
poorest countries towards its European neighbouring countries. Due to the new strategic 
considerations, the allocations of the EC changed from a focus on absolute poverty, to a more 
relative concept of poverty. This was due to a change of prioritised areas, which drew the 
focus from the poorest and neediest countries in the South, to geographically close strategic 
areas. The main motives behind this shift were to promote security and democracy close to 
EU borders. ODA to Europe increased from the 1990s and onwards, whereas ODA to Sub-
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Saharan Africa decreased substantially from 1990 to 2000. These changes occurred despite 
the fact that ODA to developing countries was more than tripled from 1990 to 2005, and 
despite the fact that the development policy changed from focusing on the associated areas, to 
embracing all developing countries, and aiming to eradicate poverty. The change away from 
recipient needs was also displayed in the fall of ODA to the LDCs and other LICs, followed 
by increasing ODA to UMICs and LMCs. It is important to note that these decreases were not 
solely a trend within the EC, but also among a wider aspect of countries within the donor 
community. Official Aid to part II counties also increased from the beginning of the 1990s 
until 2005. Apart from the fact that these recipient countries were of geo-political importance 
to the EU, the shift in increased ODA and OA towards the European countries strengthens 
Schneider and Tobin’s (2009) hypothesis that the fall of the Berlin Wall was a result of 
homogeneous interests within the EU Member States. The motives for increased aid to the 
CEECs and NIS were mainly based on security issues, geographical proximity, the promotion 
of democratic values and a sense of EU responsibility. The high allocations to the CEECs 
were also part of the preparation process to include these countries as EU members. With the 
cooperation with the EU neighbouring countries from the 1990s, the development policy of 
the EU also started to impose criteria for recipient merits. These criteria were later applied the 
whole of the EU development policy. However, applying them still remains a challenge for 
the EU. 
 
The analysis has displayed the special situation of the EU as a multilateral donor, and how the 
two-fold role of the EC forces it to balance between solidarity in one end, and strategic 
interests in the other. As previously discussed, theory states that multilateral donors are more 
prone to allocate aid according to their goals, and hence according to recipient merits and 
recipient needs. The analysis has shown that the EC’s emphasis on allocating aid to poor 
countries has varied throughout time. The declining focus on the poorest countries and 
regions, and the increasing focus on strategic interests might tempt us to reject the vision of 
the EC as an altruistic donor. Certainly, the EC cannot be seen as a “typical” multilateral 
donor solely driven by the needs or merits of the recipient country. Therefore, it is perhaps 
more appropriate to recognise the EU as a regional body with explicit political and economic 
interests, rather than a multilateral agency (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003: 
142). However, as noted in chapter two, it is unlikely that any donor would make such 
substantial allocations to a number of developing countries unless there is some benevolence, 
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and the fact that “there is no spirit moving the donors to seek opportunities for giving aid” 
(White in Siraj 2009: 3). 
 
White argues that a donors actions in a given circumstance is primarily determined by 
“historical situations” in which the donor happens to find itself (White 1974: 34 in Siraj 2009: 
3). The analysis has shown that historical events inside and outside of the EU have played a 
substantial role in the allocation of aid in two respects. First, the decolonisation process 
created the basis for the initiation of the European Community’s development policy. Second, 
the number of countries embraced by the EU development policy expanded due to the 
interests of Member States that were included in the EU. Third, the fall of the Berlin Wall 
nurtured common European interests such as security, democracy promotion, and a sense of 
EU responsibility towards their neighbouring countries. This is displayed in the increased aid 
to Europe and the Balkans around year 2000, where security issues played a significant role, 
whereas the high allocations of OA witnessed the importance of stability in neighbouring 
countries. In this respect the overarching goals expressed by the EC as a multilateral donor 
has not seemed to take precedence over its interests as a regional organisation. Still, labelling 
the EC as a donor that is solely preoccupied with fulfilling its own interests would be 
deceptive.  
 
6.3.2 Rhetoric or action? 
 
Donor commitments to poverty are not new, and commitments are not the same as what donors do in 
practice (Riddell 1999: 315). 
 
The previous chapter showed that the promises made in the development policy of the EU 
have been grand, and they are characterised by a great focus on helping the poorest countries. 
When aid is goal- and results-orientated, this improves the quality of aid (Radelet 2004). 
However, although the EC has changed its strategies during the decades following the 1960s 
in terms of which recipient countries has been prioritised, the analysis shows that the practice 
of the EC’s aid allocation has not been as focused on these goals. The development policy of 
the EC has changed from a limited scope, to including practically all developing countries of 
the world. The most noteworthy observation is that from the 1960s to the 1990s when the 
development policy was primarily focused on the EU’s associated countries, most of the EC 
aid went to the world’s poorest countries and regions. However, while the development policy 
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of the EU increased its focus on poverty eradication and allocating aid to the poorest countries 
and regions, the actual aid allocations to these areas decreased substantially, while aid to 
middle income countries increased. Thus, while the development policy made a turn from 
strategic interests to focus on recipient needs, the actual allocations changed in the opposite 
direction.  
 
Still, as the goals of the EU are ambitious, achieving them is not a simple task. Although the 
development policy has become increasingly focused on the poorest countries, the goals are 
not solely directed towards the low income countries. The Maastricht Treaty states a focus on 
developing countries in general, and the European Consensus on Development states a focus 
on both low income countries and middle income countries, while at the same time they both 
state a focus on the most deprived countries within these groups. Furthermore, the definition 
of poverty stated in the European Consensus on Development is wide, and opens to a relative 
understanding of poverty. Although poverty was widespread among in the Balkan it was not 
as widespread and extreme as is the case in war-torn African countries. Hence, it is fair to say 
that the EU has changed its actions towards a more relative concept of poverty, as opposed to 
absolute poverty, which prevails as the main goal in the development policy. Based on the 
wide definition of poverty and the large group of prioritised countries, it is nearly impossible 
to conclude that the EC has not followed its goals altogether. 
 
The EC’s efforts to allocate aid according to the MDGs are also relatively limited. In terms of 
following the Millennium Development Goals, allocations to prioritised sectors such as 
education and health have not increased since the signing of the MDGs. The MDGs state a 
focus on Africa, an area which has received less attention by the EC after the mid-1990s, 
compared to previous years. Since the MDGs were established in year 2000, the EC aid to 
Africa has increased by eight percent of total aid to developing countries from 2000 till 2005. 
Still, the allocations of the EC to Sub-Saharan Africa are far from its previous highs.  Radelet 
(2004) argues that in order to reach the MDGs, most foreign aid should be delivered to the 
low income countries as these countries have the greatest needs and least access to alternative 
sources of funding, while middle-income countries tend to have more resources available. 
Considering that the time limit for the fulfilment of the MDGs is approaching quickly, the EC 
focus has not been as poverty oriented as necessary in order to achieve the MDGs. 
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The EU’s focus on recipient needs can therefore be described as be two-faced. While the 
development policy clearly targets developing countries as the primary area of attention, the 
term “developing countries” is very wide. The actual allocation to the poorest countries does 
not correspond with the guidelines laid out in the development policy. In this respect, the EC 
seems to be more preoccupied with rhetoric than action in attacking the eradication of poverty, 
as the perceived benevolence which is stated on the Commissions web-pages on development 
is not transferred into their actual aid allocations to the extent stated in the aims of the 
development policy.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analysed the motives for aid allocation by the European Commission and how 
these motives correspond with the stated goals and objectives for the European Union’s 
development policy. The main findings can be summarised in three points. 
 
First of all, this thesis has shown that the aid allocation of the EC has changed from the 
poorest countries and regions to the neighbouring countries of the EU, even though the EU’s 
development policy has changed from a focus on associated countries to world-wide poverty 
alleviation. The change in the aid allocation is explained by the new strategic interests of the 
EU after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The end of the Cold War brought new security issues to 
the agenda, as the EU wanted to secure stability and democracy in its neighbouring states. The 
decrease of ODA to the least developed countries and Sub-Saharan Africa was mainly due to 
the war in the Balkans, and increased aid to Turkey.  From the 1990s, OA flows to the CEECs 
and the NIS increased. The CEECs were the primary beneficiaries of these allocations, as the 
EU was preparing these countries for inclusion to the EU. However, the ever increasing aid 
flows to these regions did not seem to influence the amounts of ODA allocated. Nevertheless, 
the change towards strategically important areas entailed a change from allocating aid to 
countries in absolute poverty, to countries in relative poverty, which stands in contrast to the 
set goals and objectives. 
 
Second, the EC has been influenced by its Member States until the 1990s, whose interests 
brought new countries to be covered by the EU development policy. This shows that the EC 
has not been completely independent from Member States’ interests. Furthermore, this entails 
that the aid allocation policies may very well be influenced by the strategic interests of new 
Member States in the future as well. However, after the end of the Cold War, the EC’s aid 
allocations has primarily been influenced by common European interests, such as ensuring 
security close to its borders, a sense of responsibility towards its neighbouring countries, and 
promoting democracy amongst the countries who were preparing for accession to the EU. 
Although strategic interests seem to have been the main reason for much of the EC’s aid 
allocations, inter alia for the expansions of the countries included in the development policies; 
it would not be fair to say that the EC has not also focused on recipient needs, even though 
they may not always have been the driving force behind the allocations.   
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Third, the motives of the EU are displayed through the two-fold role of the EU, as something 
between a multilateral organisation with altruistic goals and a regional organisation with 
strategic interests. Although the goals of the EU show the solidarity and altruism expected 
from a multilateral donor, the aid allocations show that the interests of the regional 
organisation tend to take precedence. The analysis has shown that in terms of poverty 
eradication, it is fair to say that the EU is more focused on rhetoric than on action, at least 
towards the poorest countries and regions of the world. It is however, important to emphasise 
that the efforts the EU has made towards its neighbouring countries must not be undermined.  
 
The answer to this thesis’ research question is thus that the aid allocation of the EC has 
primarily been influenced by strategic interests. There is a discernable change in how these 
strategic interests are promoted over time: First, the prioritised areas were limited to the 
countries where the Member States had colonial ties, and second, common EU interests 
promoted the cooperation with neighbouring countries from the 1990s. Still, the poorest 
countries and regions were the main beneficiaries until the 1990s, which may entail that both 
the motives of recipient needs and strategic interests have worked together in determining the 
EC aid allocations. The strategic interests were primarily influenced by Member States until 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, whereas after the Cold War, common EU interests provided the 
incentive to allocate aid to strategic areas. Although allocating aid according to recipient 
merits has become a dominant view for aid allocation, not only in the EU, but also 
internationally, the challenges to fulfil this goal remain. Lastly, whereas the goals of the EU 
focus primarily on absolute poverty, the aid allocation has been more concentrated towards 
countries in relative poverty. These findings indicate that the EC only follows its goals to a 
certain extent, as the poorest countries have lost priority.  
 
7.1 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although the EC is an independent organ of the EU, whose aid is described as multilateral, 
the development policy, the goals and objectives are valid for the EU as a whole. That is, as 
described in this thesis, the development policy implies cooperation between the Member 
States themselves, as well as the Member States with the EC. Analysing the EC and its 
Member States development policy combined would be an interesting continuation in the line 
of EU allocation research. As the treaties state the cooperation and convergence of developing 
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policy between the EC and its Member States, it would be interesting to analyse how these 
work together, and whether these correspond.  
 
This thesis has focused solely on aid as part of the development policy. However, the 
development policy and goals for development cooperation extends beyond development aid. 
As seen in the Treaty of Rome, much focus was put on trade relations and assisting 
developing countries by abolishing custom duties on imports. That focus was continued with 
the Lomé and Cotonou agreements. McGillivray (2003: 6) argues that trade promotion in 
particular should be a donor interest. Furthermore, EU is the major trade partner with most 
African countries, thus the primary economic influence on Africa (Goodison and Stoneman, 
2005: 16). Hence, more effort should be used to investigate how trade and aid work together 
to promote development and eradicate poverty. 
 
Moreover, this thesis has shown that the policies of the EU tend to diverge from its actions. 
An interesting and necessary continuation of this thesis would be to show exactly how the 
bureaucratic processes in the EU institutions affect the creation and implementation of the 
development policy. 
 
Lastly, considering how international and internal trends such as the end of the Cold War 
have affected the allocations of aid, an interesting topic for the future would be to analyse 
whether the international financial crisis that began 2008 had an impact on the EC’s aid 
allocations. Aid is regarded as a ‘soft target’ when it comes to budget cuts, and therefore aid 
allocations might have deceased by changing priorities (ActionAid International 2006). As the 
financial crisis hit the European countries hard, as seen by the state deficits in several EU 
countries, this might have implications for the aid allocation to the poorest countries. 
 
7.2 THE FUTURE FOR EC AID 
This thesis has shown that there are challenges for the EU in the future if they want to reach 
their high set goals. Also, the time limit set for the MDGs is approaching quickly. On April 
21st, the European Commission published its annual ‘April Package’ of development related 
policy papers, including a ‘Twelve point action plan in support of the MDGs’ (Davis 2010). 
This paper recognises many of the past challenges for aid allocation and aid efficiency, and 
still, 1.4 billion people live in extreme poverty, the majority of these in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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New challenges, amongst them the global financial crisis, pandemics and climate change also 
have an impact on the fight against poverty. One important challenge, following the economic 
crisis of 2008 which also has created financial problems within the EU Member States, is that 
less money is now available for development aid (European Commission 2010a). Still, several 
aims in the development related policy papers only confirm the already stated goals of EU’s 
development policy: coordination of the development policies of the EU and its Member 
States, prioritise the LDCs and increase aid efficiency. Furthermore, the action plan sets 
renewed effort to reach the MDGs by 2015, and a way forward as to how the EU should 
approach the challenges of reaching the goals. These include to reach the goal of delivering 
0.7 percent of GNI, focus on climate change and turning its promises into practical and 
effective action (European Commission 2010a: 12). The last statement is perhaps the most 
important. The promises and goals are in place, but it is the EU’s own responsibility to make 
sure that the policies are followed in order to help the world reach the MDGs. Year 2010 is 
the ‘European Year against Poverty and Social Exclusion’, but it remains to be seen whether 
the EU will increase its efforts to promote sustainable development and fight poverty.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I 
Extract from the development policy in the Treaty of Rome, 1957, Part IV: Articles 131-133. 
 
Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories 
 
Article 131  
The Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-European countries and 
territories which have special relations with Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. These countries and territories (hereinafter called the 'countries and 
territories') are listed in Annex IV to this Treaty. 
The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social development of the 
countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the 
Community as a whole. 
In accordance with the principles set out in the Preamble to this Treaty, association shall serve 
primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and 
territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which 
they aspire. 
Article 132 
Association shall have the following objectives:  
1. Member States shall apply to their trade with the countries and territories the same 
treatment as they accord each other pursuant to this Treaty.  
2. Each country or territory shall apply to its trade with Member States and with the other 
countries and territories the same treatment as that which it applies to the European 
State with which it has special relations.  
3. The Member States shall contribute to the investments required for the progressive 
development of these countries and territories.  
4. For investments financed by the Community, participation in tenders and supplies 
shall be open on equal terms to all natural and legal persons who are nationals of a 
Member State or of one of the countries and territories.  
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5. In relations between Member States and the countries and territories the right of 
establishment of nationals and companies or firms shall be regulated in accordance 
with the provisions and procedures laid down in the Chapter relating to the right of 
establishment and on a non-discriminatory basis, subject to any special provisions laid 
down pursuant to Art. 136.  
Article 133  
1. Customs duties on imports into the Member States of goods originating in the 
countries and territories shall be completely abolished in conformity with the 
progressive abolition of customs duties between Member States in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty.  
2. Customs duties on imports into each country or territory from Member States or from 
the other countries or territories shall be progressively abolished in accordance with 
the provisions of Arts. 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17.  
3. The countries and territories may, however, levy customs duties which meet the needs 
of their development and industrialisation or produce revenue for their budgets.  
The duties referred to in the preceding subparagraph shall nevertheless be 
progressively reduced to the level of those imposed on imports of products from the 
Member State with which each country or territory has special relations. The 
percentages and the timetable of the reductions provided for under this Treaty shall 
apply to the differences between the duty imposed on a product comiltg from the 
Member State which has special relations with the country or territory concerned and 
the duty imposed on the same product coming from within the Community on entry 
into the importing country or territory. 
4. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to countries and territories which, by reason of the 
particular international obligations by which they are bound, already apply a non-
discriminatory customs tariff when this Treaty enters into force.  
5. The introduction of or any change in customs duties imposed on goods imported into 
the countries and territories shall not, either in law or in fact, give rise to any direct or 
indirect discrimination between imports from the various Member States.  
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Appendix II 
Extract from the development policy in the Maastricht Treat (Treaty on the European Union), 
Title XVII, Articles 130u-130y: 
 
Article 130 u 
1. Community policy in the sphere of development co-operation, which shall be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster: 
- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more 
particularly the most disadvantaged among them; 
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; 
- the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. 
2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
3. The Community and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take 
account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other 
competent international organizations. 
 
Article 130 v 
The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 130u in the policies 
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. 
 
Article 130 w 
1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty the Council, acting in accordance 
with the procedure referred to in Article 189c, shall adopt the measures necessary to further 
the objectives referred to in Article 130u. Such measures may take the form of multiannual 
programmes. 
2. The European Investment Bank shall contribute, under the terms laid down in its Statute, to 
the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph One. 
3. The provisions of this Article shall not affect co-operation with the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries in the framework of the ACP-EEC Convention. 
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Article 130 x 
1. The Community and the Member States shall co-ordinate their policies on development co-
operation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international 
organizations and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action. Member 
States shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Community aid programmes. 
2. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote the co-ordination referred to in 
paragraph One. 
 
Article 130 y 
Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall 
co-operate with third countries and with the competent international organizations. The 
arrangements for Community co-operation may be the subject of agreements between the 
Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in 
accordance with Article 228. The previous paragraph shall be without prejudice to Member 
States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international 
agreements.’ 
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Appendix III 
 
Overview of ACP countries, placed in their respective income-grouping and regional 
grouping. The division of ACP-countries in income-groupings and regional groupings are 
based on the categorisation in OECD.stat.  
 
ACP-countries Income-grouping Region 
Angola LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Antigua and Barbuda UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Bahamas MADCT 
North and Central 
America 
Barbados UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Belize UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Benin LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana UMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Burkina Faso LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Burundi LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cameroon LMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cape Verde LMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Central African Republic LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Chad LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Comoros LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Congo, Dem. Rep. LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Congo, Rep of. LMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cook Islands UMIC Oceania 
Cote D'Ivoire OLIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cuba UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Djibouti LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Dominica UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Dominican Republic LMIC 
North and Central 
America 
East Timor LDC Far East Asia 
Equatorial Guinea LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Eritrea LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Ethiopia LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Fiji UMIC Oceania 
Gabon UMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Gambia LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Ghana OLIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Grenada UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Guinea LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Guinea-Bissau LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Guyana LMIC South America 
Haiti LDC 
North and Central 
America 
Jamaica UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Kenya LMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Kiribati LDC Oceania 
Lesotho LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Liberia LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Madagascar LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Malawi LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mali LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Marshall Islands LMIC Oceania 
Mauritania LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mauritius UMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Micronesia, Fed. States of. LMIC Oceania 
Mozambique LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Namibia LMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Nauru UMIC Oceania 
Niger LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Nigeria OLIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Niue LMIC Oceania 
Palau UMIC Oceania 
Papua New Guinea OLIC Oceania 
Rwanda LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
St. Kitts and Nevis UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
St. Lucia UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Samoa LDC Oceania 
Sao Tome and Principe LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Senegal LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Seychelles UMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sierra Leone LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Solomon Islands LDC Oceania 
Somalia LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
South Africa UMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sudan LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Suriname UMIC South America 
Swaziland LMIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Tanzania LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Togo LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Tonga LMIC Oceania 
 
Trinidad and Tobago UMIC 
North and Central 
America 
Tuvalu LDC Oceania 
Uganda LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Vanuatu LDC Oceania 
Zambia LDC Sub-Saharan Africa 
Zimbabwe OLIC Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
